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As the population of elderly Americans swells in coming
decades, growing numbers of citizens will experience some
degree of cognitive incapacity and require the assistance of
surrogate decision-makers. Consequently, the decisions of
guardians, conservators, and agents will become increasingly
important. Experts have frequently noted that, despite modern
reforms, doctrines concerning surrogate decision-making are
problematic and often do not result in outcomes that maximize
autonomy and promote respect for the unique personhood of the
adult with diminished capacity. Unlike other writings that seek
to refashion or clarify surrogate decision-making statutes and
standards, this Article suggests that a more fundamental problem
lies in our inherent, if unwitting, tendency to infantilize the elderly
and other adults with diminished capacity. Until we acknowledge
and examine our biases and prejudices about age and incapacity,
we as surrogate decision-makers will continue to make
unfortunate choices for those whom we seek to assist, regardless
of definitional changes in decision-making statutes and
standards.

I. INTRODUCTION
The typical American adult assumes that she will always
enjoy the right to choose where she will live, how she will pass
her days, and with whom she will share her life.1 Most American

1. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 327-28 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003) (“Autonomy, an adult person’s right to live life consistent with his or her personal
values, is one of the bedrock principles of a free society.”). The Groves court further stated,
Accordingly, adult persons have a right to exercise autonomous selfdetermination. They have the right to choose how they live, how they spend
their money, and with whom they associate without undue governmental
interference.
When viewed as personal power, autonomy takes on added significance to
elderly persons, many of whom fear the loss of their independence and their
ability to control their own lives. All that many elderly persons have under
their control is the prerogative to decide how to live out the rest of their days
and how and in what manner they will control their own property. Their ability
to exercise this control and to maintain their individual dignity often forms the
basis for their self-esteem and their belief in their continuing viability as a
person. Thus, the loss of status as an autonomous member of society can
intensify any disability that an elderly person may have.
Id. at 328 (footnotes omitted).
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adults do enjoy these freedoms throughout their lives;2 thus, the
odds are that her assumptions will prove true.3 She knows little
or nothing of guardianships and conservatorships4 and their
associated judicial proceedings that can curtail the freedoms of an
adult with diminished capacity5—a curtailment that, in some
ways, can exceed the limitations imposed on convicted felons
residing in prison.6 She has not considered the ways in which an
2. See id. at 331-32 (noting in conservatorship case that being old is not the same as
being disabled and that, in fact, “a vast majority of the elderly are not experiencing a
progressive physical or mental decline”).
3. Although the vast majority of American adults are never placed under a
conservatorship or guardianship, a simple and disturbing fact is that we do not really know
just how many adults are placed under a conservatorship or guardianship in the United States
each year. See Sally Hurme & Erica Wood, Introduction to the Third National Guardianship
Summit: Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1157, 1162 (“We as a nation are
essentially working in the dark when describing adult guardianship practice. Data and
research are scant to nonexistent. Many courts and states do not know the number of adults
under guardianship in their jurisdiction, let alone the demographics.”) Hurme and Wood
further state, “In 2011, the National Center for State Courts estimated that there are 1.5
million active pending adult guardianship cases—but that this number could, in fact, range
from fewer than one million to more than three million.” Id.
4. Guardianship and conservatorship terminology varies across the country. In some
states, a fiduciary may be guardian of the person, guardian of the person’s estate, or both.
See, e.g., 20 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5521 (West 2017) (using term “guardian”
for person and estate management). In other states, a fiduciary may be conservator of the
person and conservator of the person’s estate, or both. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 34-1101 (West 2017) (employing term “conservator” for person and estate management of adult);
see also LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER LAW: CASES &
MATERIALS 360 (5th ed. 2011) (noting that “[s]tates use a variety of terms” for the manager
of the incapacitated ‘person’s property). Under the Uniform Probate Code, a guardian serves
the person. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-102(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). A conservator
manages the estate of a protected person. UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-102(1) (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2010). This Article generally employs the UPC distinction except when quoting
from statutes or cases employing different terminology. Nonetheless, the reader should keep
in mind the wide discrepancies that exist in terminology among the states.
5. See, e.g., Kristin Booth Glen, Changing Paradigms: Mental Capacity, Legal
Capacity, Guardianship, and Beyond, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 93, 104-06 (2012)
(discussing the paradigm of American guardianship law that prevailed throughout most of
the twentieth century and that could limit or completely deny basic civil rights to those
declared “incompetent”).
6. See Hedin v. Gonzales (In re Guardianship of Hedin), 528 N.W.2d 567, 573-74
(Iowa 1995) (observing commentator’s statement that “[a]lthough the determination of
incompetency is in no way a criminal proceeding, the result in terms of the defendant’s
liberty interests may be very similar. He may be deprived of control over his residence, his
associations, his property, his diet, and his ability to go where he wishes” (citing Bobbe
Shapiro Nolan, Functional Evaluation of the Elderly in Guardianship Proceedings, 12 L.
MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 214 (1984))); In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317,
329 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that subjects of conservatorship proceedings “face a
substantial loss of freedom . . . that resembles the loss of freedom following a criminal
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agent with unlimited powers can use a durable power of attorney,
without judicial oversight, to control her life.7 If now and then
the possibility of future incapacity flickers across her mind, she
quickly pushes it aside.8
My views, however, differ from those of the typical
American adult. As a professor who has taught and written in the
field of elder law for over twenty years,9 my teaching and research
have daily impressed upon me that life offers no guarantees of
conviction” (citations omitted)). Despite modern reforms in guardianship and
conservatorship law, wards may still find themselves facing limitations that give almost no
real possibility of their making “even the most basic decisions for themselves.” Groves, 109
S.W.3d at 329; see also Jan Ellen Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the
Elderly in the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory
Refocus and Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1818, 1825 (1992) (observing, in article
written near the beginning of the modern reform movement, that a ward under guardianship
may have “fewer legal rights than a convict in prison”).
7. See Carolyn L. Dessin, Financial Abuse of the Elderly: Is the Solution a Problem?,
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 267, 316-17 (2003) (noting that despite its flexibility and potential
usefulness as an estate planning tool, the durable power of attorney also raises dangers of
agent abuse, especially since the document can give an agent total control of the principal’s
estate). For an overview of durable powers of attorney, see James H. Pietsch, Alternatives to
Guardianship and Supported Decision-Making, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT
GUARDIANSHIP 285, 287-90 (A. Kimberley Dayton ed., 2014) (noting that powers of
attorney are “probably the most popular” and frequently used alternative to guardianships
and conservatorships); Linda S. Whitton, Durable Powers as an Alternative to
Guardianship: Lessons We Have Learned, 37 STETSON L. REV. 7, 52 (2007) [hereinafter
Whitton, Durable Powers] (“[T]rustworthiness of the agent, the willingness of third persons
to accept the agent’s authority, and the cooperation of the incapacitated principal’s family
are key components to the successful use of durable powers.”).
8. If she is among the minority who takes precautionary measures in case she should
become incapacitated, she may execute a durable power of attorney for health care and a
durable power of attorney for estate matters. These are important, often very helpful
documents that can enhance the chances that her expressed wishes and continuing autonomy
will be respected should she become incapacitated. Nevertheless, powers of attorney placed
in the hands of an agent who acts improperly are often far worse than court-supervised
guardianships and conservatorships. See Russ ex rel. Schwartz v. Russ, 734 N.W.2d 874,
888 (Wis. 2007) (Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (noting that the durable power of attorney
is “a troublesome document, creating the potential for abuse” by giving an agent “the power
to sell the principal’s home and any other assets, to make investments, to cancel insurance
policies or name new beneficiaries, and even to empty the bank accounts”). In fact, the
existence of a durable power of attorney does not preclude the possibility of a future
guardianship or conservatorship proceeding. See, e.g., Vernon H. v. Peter H. (In re Protective
Proceedings of Vernon H.), 332 P.3d 565, 567-69 (Alaska 2014) (discussing unsuccessful
guardianship petition brought by one of proposed ward’s fifteen children despite durable
power of attorney that proposed ward had given to another child).
9. I began teaching an Elder Law survey class in the 1990s—when Elder Law was a
relatively new subject in the law school curriculum—at the University of Memphis Cecil C.
Humphreys School of Law.
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continuing capacity.10 Having entered my seventh decade of life,
I know more than ever that the chance of diminishing capacity
increases with old age.11
What I fear more than a possible future of incapacity,
however, is how the law and those individuals who might become
my decision-makers will respond should their intervention be
warranted.12 I know that when an adult becomes incapacitated,
too often our judges, lawyers, and surrogate decision-makers
focus on the individual’s limitations while minimizing the
importance of the wishes he previously made known or currently
expresses.13 Moreover, despite statutory admonitions and judicial
opinions stating that old age is not the equivalent of incapacity,14
the unwitting tendency is for judges, lawyers, surrogate decisionmakers and everyday folk to act as though old age itself—whether

10. See, e.g., RALPH C. BRASHIER, MASTERING ELDER LAW (2d ed. 2015) (discussing
major principles of elder law); Ralph C. Brashier, Conservatorships, Capacity, and Crystal
Balls, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 1 (2014) [hereinafter Brashier, Crystal Balls] (discussing wills
executed by persons under guardianship and conservatorship); Ralph C. Brashier, The
Ghostwritten Will, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1803 (2013) (discussing durable powers of attorney and
whether a principal’s willmaking ability should be delegable).
11. See Doug Surtees, Constructing Incapacity: Deconstructing Capacity in Adult
Guardianship, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 7, at
273, 275, 279 (observing that guardianship has long been a primary vehicle for substituted
decision-making and that “[t]he majority of persons subjected to substituted decision making
regimes are older as opposed to younger”); Glen, supra note 5, at 108-09 (noting that changes
in guardianship procedures came in part from work of American Bar Association
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly and also from work of Commission on Mental
and Physical Disability).
12. The guardianship, conservatorship, and health-care power-of-attorney statutes of
many states often include a priority list of individuals who, in the absence of a designation
by the adult who now has diminished capacity, might serve as default substitute decisionmakers. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-310 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010) (providing
priority list for who may be a guardian); UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-413 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2010) (providing priority list for who may be a conservator); UNIF. HEALTH-CARE
DECISIONS ACT § 5(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (providing default list for who may serve
as surrogate decision-maker).
13. See infra note 79 and accompanying text (noting how a person with a cognitive
disability may have preferences that change over time).
14. See, e.g., Harvey v. Meador, 459 So. 2d 288, 292 (Miss. 1984) (opining that a
person’s old age alone is not enough for the imposition of substitute decision-maker for the
person, even when “advanced age” is mentioned in statute); In re Conservatorship of Groves,
109 S.W.3d 317, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) (“The aging process, by itself, is not a disabling
condition, and being elderly is not tantamount to being disabled.”).
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or not accompanied by incapacity—causes one to revert to a
childlike state.15
This Article suggests that our tendency to conflate adult
incapacity and infancy is not inevitable.16 By acknowledging,
examining, and discarding unwarranted biases and prejudices
about incapacity and old age,17 we can take a much-needed initial
step towards asking essential questions18 and making decisions
that will better serve the interests of adults with a cognitive
incapacity.19 Through an honest evaluation of why we tend to
infantilize adults with diminished capacity, we are more likely to
curb unwarranted intrusion into their lives and promote autonomy
consistent with their abilities.20

15. See infra Part III (discussing why people infantilize the incapacitated and elderly);
see also Hedin v. Gonzales (In re Guardianship of Hedin), 528 N.W.2d 567, 572 (Iowa 1995)
(citing Sheryl Dicker, Guardianship: Overcoming the Last Hurdle to Civil Rights for the
Mentally Disabled, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 485, 485-86 (1981)) (noting observation that
a person under a guardianship is reduced to the status of a child).
16. See infra Part III (discussing reasons we infantilize the elderly).
17. For an early and still enlightening discussion of the effects of unacknowledged
biases and prejudices in judging and the law, see JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
MIND 148-54 (Anchor Books 1963) (1930).
18. See infra Part V (discussing questions that should never go unasked in substitute
decision-making settings).
19. See infra Part V. Terminology concerning individuals with a disability has
evolved through the decades. Today, law and society at least pay lip service to the basic
principle that proper focus is on the individual, not her disability. Thus an older term such as
“disabled person” is now less likely to be used than a term such as “person with a disability.”
See, e.g., Glen, supra note 5, at 94 n.4 (discussing the importance of nomenclature, stating
that “[u]nderstanding and naming a person solely based on her disability—‘idiot,
incapacitated person’—reduces the person to her disability and makes her an object of the
law”). In this Article, I use principally the terms “adult with a cognitive incapacity” or “adult
with diminished capacity.”
20. See infra Part III (discussing modern reform goals of focusing on the individual
and seeking to maximize her autonomy and abilities). The modern goal of personcenteredness is discussed further in Leslie P. Francis, Preface to the Third National
Guardianship Summit: Standards of Excellence, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1155, 1155 (discussing
limited guardianship and noting that “‘[r]espect for inherent dignity, individual autonomy
including the freedom to make one’s own choices, and independence of persons’ is the very
first of the guiding principles of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities” (quoting United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with
Disabilities art. 3(a), Mar. 5, 2008, 2515 U.N.T.S. 70)); A. Frank Johns, Person-Centered
Planning in Guardianship: A Little Hope for the Future, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1541, 1544
(“[N]o statutes, regulations, or standards mandate person-centered guardianship.”).
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II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
Modern assisted-decision-making statutes seek to reform an
historical lack of respect for wards, conservatees, and principals
and have their origins in the last years of the twentieth century.21
Viewed broadly, one can see in recent reforms a societal desire to
ensure that adults with a cognitive incapacity receive due respect
for their autonomy, dignity, and uniqueness.22 These reforms
have achieved some of their goals.23 This is particularly true
concerning goals for which legislators can establish highly
detailed procedures that a substitute decision-maker must
follow.24 State legislatures have had substantially less success in
21. See Nicole M. Arsenault, Start with a Presumption She Doesn’t Want to Be Dead:
Fatal Flaws in Guardianships of Individuals with Intellectual Disability, 35 LAW & INEQ.
23, 26-32 (2017) (discussing guardianship history from its origins in parens patriae doctrine
through symposia of late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and significant evolution
in modern uniform laws).
22. Perhaps the best-known statutory exemplars incorporating modern reforms are the
uniform laws concerning guardianship, conservatorship, and powers of attorney.
Guardianship and conservatorships are covered in the Uniform Guardianship and Protective
Proceedings Act (revised in 1997 and now serving as Article 5 of the Uniform Probate Code).
See UNIF. PROB. CODE Art. 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2010). The Uniform Power of Attorney
Act was promulgated in 2006. See UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT §§ 201-217 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2006). The Uniform Law Commission website provides maps indicating those
jurisdictions that have adopted or are considering adoption of various uniform acts. See
Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act: Enactment Status Map,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION,
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%20
Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings%20Jurisdiction%20Act
[https://perma.cc/E3C8-PM9V]; Probate Code: Enactment Status Map, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http:// www. uniformlaws .org/ Act.aspx?title= Probate%20Code
[https://perma.cc/E8EF-ASEF]; Power of Attorney: Enactment Status Map , UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, http:// uniformlaws.org/ Act.aspx?title= Power%20 of%20Attorney
[https://perma.cc/8NVH-K9RJ].
23. For example, today most state statutory schemes reflect a preference for a limited
guardianship over a plenary guardianship, when possible, as a manifestation of the general
acceptance that ultimately what is appropriate is the least restrictive alternative for the
particular individual in question. See generally NINA A. KOHN, ELDER LAW: PRACTICE,
POLICY, AND PROBLEMS 142-45, 158 (2014) (providing overview of modern guardianship
provisions, and noting statutory availability of limited guardianship and mandatory use in
some statutory schemes). The mandates of modern statutory reform, of course, are not
always carried out in practice. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Frolik, Guardianship Reform: When
the Best is the Enemy of the Good, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 347, 354 (1998) (“In order for
judges to enthusiastically support limited guardianship and other recent reforms, they must
appreciate why the underlying values of personal autonomy and independence trump the
need for protection.”).
24. Despite the inclusion of mandatory procedural rules, state approaches to many
aspects of guardianship and conservatorship proceedings still vary considerably. See, e.g.,
A. Kimberley Dayton et al., Guardianship and Conservatorship, in 3 ADVISING THE
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accomplishing other goals, particularly those aspirational goals
that were an important part of the impetus for the reform
movement.25 As is often the case, the letter of the law has been
easier to implement than the spirit underlying it.26
Unlike older statutory schemes that commonly allowed
judges in guardianship and conservatorship cases to sit unchecked
like kings on a throne,27 modern guardianship and
conservatorship laws are designed to provide procedural and
substantive protections for the person who is the subject of a
guardianship or conservatorship petition.28 Durable power-ofattorney statutes, which first achieved widespread acceptance in
the last quarter of the twentieth century,29 have also evolved in
ways that seek to protect a principal from improper acts of an
agent.30
Today’s guardianship, conservatorship, and power of
attorney laws recognize that individuals have many different
abilities and that a particular individual’s ability in a particular
area may wax and wane along a very broad spectrum throughout
life.31 Indeed, many statutes now focus on “capacity,”32 rejecting
ELDERLY CLIENT § 34:30, Westlaw (database updated June 2017) (noting that not all states
require the judge to engage in mandatory fact-finding process underlying a judgment of
incapacity; noting also, however, that “[w]ritten findings of fact are critical if an appeal . . .
is anticipated”).
25. See, e.g., Frolik, supra note 23, at 354 (noting that limited guardianship has not
been a success and observing that judges must be “sold” on the concept, which will require
them to appreciate the importance of independence and autonomy).
26. See id. (discussing prerequisites for courts to internalize the statutory preference
for limited over plenary guardianships).
27. See Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34:25 (discussing paternalistic attitude of some
judges who “may decide cases as much through ‘intuition’ than through clearly stated
standards and procedures”).
28. See Glen, supra note 5, at 108-19 (discussing stages and results of guardianship
reform).
29. See generally Karen E. Boxx, The Durable Power of Attorney’s Place in the
Family of Fiduciary Relationships, 36 GA. L. REV. 1, 4-14 (2001) (providing a history of the
durable power of attorney and noting that all states had durable power-of-attorney statutes
by 1984).
30. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006)
(providing that agent must act “in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to
the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest”; in
good faith; and within scope of authority granted).
31. See, e.g., In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 333 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2003) (“Capacity is not an abstract, all-or-nothing proposition.”).
32. See, e.g., Richard F. Spiegle & Spencer J. Crona, Legal Guidelines and Methods
for Evaluating Capacity, 32 COLO. LAW. 65, 65 (2003) (noting that capacity typically is a
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the older term “competency”33 for the very reason that, in the past,
courts and society often evaluated an individual’s competency
using a single “on/off switch” approach, disregarding the fact that
an individual has any number of abilities, each of which may
fluctuate significantly over time.34
Recognizing the possible variability in an individual’s
abilities,35 modern laws therefore contemplate that no fiduciary
be permitted to act until either the person represented agrees 36 or
a careful determination occurs to ensure that the represented
person requires the services of the fiduciary.37 For example,

legal concept, whereas competency is typically a medical or clinical concept); Kristin
Mueller, Note, The Evolution of Guardianship Law in Iowa: A Search for Fairness and
Justice in Guardianship Proceedings, 45 DRAKE L. REV. 963, 972–73 (1997) (observing
trend focusing on capacity rather than competency).
33. See Hedin v. Gonzales (In re Guardianship of Hedin), 528 N.W.2d 567, 573 (Iowa
1995) (noting traditional approach under which “states operate under an ‘all or nothing’
guardianship law, meaning that a person either is fully competent or is not fully competent
to handle his or her affairs”).
34. See Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 334 (“Capacity is . . . situational and contextual, and
it may even have a motivational component.”). Further elaborating on capacity, the Groves
court stated as follows:
[Capacity] may be affected by many variables that constantly change over
time. These variables include external factors such as the time of day, place,
social setting, and support from relatives, friends, and supportive agencies. It
may also be affected by neurologic, psychiatric, or other medical conditions,
such as polypharmacy, many of which are reversible with proper treatment.
Finally, capacity is not necessarily static. It is fluid and can fluctuate from
moment to moment. A change in surroundings may affect capacity, and a
person’s capacity may improve with treatment, training, greater exposure to a
particular type of situation, or simply the passage of time.
Id.
35. See, e.g., Evelyn M. Tenenbaum, To Be or To Exist: Standards for Deciding
Whether Dementia Patients in Nursing Homes Should Engage in Intimacy, Sex, and
Adultery, 42 IND. L. REV. 675, 711-13 (2009) (discussing modern judicial view that seeks to
assess “functional competence,” rejecting older approach that assessed “competence by
making a single, global decision that a person is competent or incompetent”).
36. Moreover, fiduciary duties cannot be imposed upon a person who does not agree
to accept the fiduciary position. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 113 (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney, a person accepts
appointment as an agent under a power of attorney by exercising authority or performing
duties as an agent or by any other assertion or conduct indicating acceptance.”).
37. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 109(c) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006) (“If
a power of attorney becomes effective upon the principal’s incapacity and the principal has
not authorized a person to determine whether the principal is incapacitated, or the person
authorized is unable or unwilling to make the determination, the power of attorney becomes
effective upon a determination in a writing or other record by: (1) a physician [or licensed
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unless a capable principal has executed an immediately effective
durable power of attorney or has explicitly defined the
circumstances under which the power of attorney will take effect,
the default rules of power-of-attorney statutes often require that
someone other than the agent determine whether the principal is
incapacitated and thus in need of an agent to act on her behalf.38
Similarly, guardianship and conservatorship statutes have default
provisions that, at least in theory, serve to ensure not only the
respondent’s procedural and substantive protection at the
instigation of a proceeding,39 but also throughout the proceeding
and throughout the existence of a resulting guardianship or
conservatorship.40
Underlying the reforms in these fiduciary laws is the belief
that every human being, whatever her capacities, is a unique
individual worthy of respect.41 Concomitantly, a fundamental
aspiration of modern fiduciary reform is to maximize the
individual’s autonomy consistent with her abilities.42 Indeed, in

psychologist] that the principal is incapacitated . . . or (2) an attorney at law, a judge, or an
appropriate governmental official that the principal is incapacitated . . . .”).
38. Thus, when a power of attorney is silent on the determination of a principal’s
incapacity, a default provision may require that a medical or psychiatric professional
determine that the principal is incapacitated before the agent can began to act. UNIF. POWER
OF ATT’Y ACT § 109(c). In guardianship and conservatorship proceedings, laws require not
only that the respondent be afforded proper notice and the opportunity to be heard, but also
may require that the respondent appear at the proceeding or provide good reason for not
appearing. Glen, supra note 5, at 113-14.
39. See Glen, supra note 5, at 108-19 (discussing procedural and decision-making
reforms of recent decades).
40. But see Arsenault, supra note 21, at 7, 29 (“[T]he reality is that most guardianships
go unmonitored after the initial court hearing concludes.”); Francis, supra note 20, at 115556 (noting that once guardianship is established, states have paid much less attention to its
actual operation); Sally Balch Hurme & Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability Then and
Now: Tracing Tenets for an Active Court Role, 31 STETSON L. REV. 867, 925-29 (2002)
(discussing continuing problems of guardianship monitoring and noting a “host of knotty
questions go to the heart of the monitoring issue and bear further examination”).
41. But see Frolik, supra note 23, at 354 (observing that many judges will not
enthusiastically support modern reforms until they “appreciate . . . underlying values of
personal autonomy and independence”).
42. Meeting of Legis. Commission’s Subcomm. to Study Issues Relating to Senior
Citizens and Veterans, Assembl. Con. Res. No. 35, File No. 109, 74th Int. Sess. exh. P-2
(Nev. Feb. 5, 2008) (informational document offered by the Honorable David Hardy, noting
that “[m]ore than 30 states . . . have substantially reformed their guardianship statutes in the
last 20 years” and “[t]he trend in guardianship reform is [statutorily mandated] greater
autonomy for the ward”). Judge Hardy cites as examples of reform legislation the following:
“right to counsel, the right to effective notice, standardized forms and petition requirements,
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guardianship and conservator laws, if a less intrusive form of
assistance is available, modern statutes may specifically require
the use of that less intrusive measure in lieu of appointment of a
guardian or conservator.43
Moreover, even when the individual clearly requires a
surrogate decision-maker, under most statutory schemes that
decision-maker is guided first by the directions provided by the
individual before the need for a fiduciary arose.44 In the absence
of such directions, often the decision-maker is to act in
accordance with traditional principles of substituted judgment,45
basing the decision on what the individual would or probably
would have done had she retained the ability to make the instant
decision herself.46
Importantly, modern statutes often contemplate the
individual’s continuing participation in the decision-making
process even when the individual is represented by a fiduciary.47
Thus, to the extent that the individual can reliably state a current
preference48 between or among decision-making options, the

the right to be present at hearings, the right to cross-examination, the development of least
restrictive alternatives, and the requirement of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” Id.
43. See KOHN, supra note 23, at 143 (discussing general agreement that today favors
use of least restrictive alternative doctrine).
44. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Surrogate Selection: An Increasingly Viable, But
Limited, Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 183,
208-14 (2010) (discussing bases on which substituted decision-makers are to make decisions,
and noting first responsibility of decision-maker is to implement instructions of person with
incapacity). Although the article addresses in particular surrogate decision-making in
matters of medical futility, the general discussion concerning bases of substituted decisionmaking largely reflects the approach demonstrated in most modern American substituted
decision-making scenarios.
45. See id. at 210-12 (noting that surrogate decision-makers are to use substituted
judgment, when possible, if the person with incapacity has provided no instructions).
46. See id. at 212-14 (discussing use of best interest standard when the adult with
incapacity did not provide instructions and decision-maker has no basis for inferring adult’s
values and preferences); Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 701 (stating that, when adult formerly
had no cognitive incapacity, courts traditionally favor use of substituted judgment over a best
interests test).
47. See, e.g., UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994)
(“An agent shall make a health-care decision in accordance with the principal’s individual
instructions, if any, and other wishes to the extent known to the agent. Otherwise, the agent
shall make the decision in accordance with the agent’s determination of the principal’s best
interest. In determining the principal’s best interest, the agent shall consider the principal’s
personal values to the extent known to the agent.”)
48. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e).
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fiduciary is not free simply to ignore that stated preference.49
Judges, commentators, and statutes themselves often state that the
fiduciary is ultimately to serve the best interests50 of the
individual he represents through the power of attorney,
guardianship, or conservatorship.51 Undergirding this directive is
the belief that in most instances the fiduciary will respect the
individual’s autonomy and serve the individual’s best interest52
first by following the individual’s directions (previously given or
currently reliably expressed) and, if no such directions exist,
second by using principles of substituted judgment.53 Only when
the fiduciary has no direct guidance from the individual and no
basis for applying substituted judgment (including some settings
in which the application of substituted judgment will clearly
result in harm to the individual) is the fiduciary free to make a
decision based on an objective determination of the individual’s
“best interest”—a determination frequently formulated from
beliefs about what a “reasonable person” would do.54

III. WHY WE INFANTILIZE ADULTS WITH A
COGNITIVE IMPAIRMENT
Many adults with diminished capacity—and elderly adults
in general—know all too well that society often treats them as

49. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e).
50. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e).
51. UNIF. HEALTH-CARE DECISIONS ACT § 2(e).
52. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE art. V prefatory note (2010) (discussing developments
in the areas of guardianship and conservatorship, noting “groundbreaking” support of
autonomy in 1982 version, and noting further that 1997 revision provided that “guardianship
and conservatorship should be viewed as a last resort, that limited guardianships or
conservatorships should be used whenever possible, and that the guardian or conservator
should consult with the ward or protected person, to the extent feasible, when making
decisions”).
53. See, e.g., UNIF. POWER OF ATT’Y ACT § 114(a)(1) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2006)
(providing that agent shall “act in accordance with the principal’s reasonable expectations to
the extent actually known by the agent and, otherwise, in the principal’s best interest”).
54. For an excellent and detailed investigation of the variations and complexities
concerning the two standards, see generally Linda S. Whitton & Lawrence A. Frolik,
Surrogate Decision-Making Standards for Guardians: Theory and Reality, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 1491 (examining the intricacies of the substituted judgment and best interest standards);
see also Hurme & Wood, supra note 3, at 1170 (“While [the two standards are] seemingly
straightforward in definition, the application of either standard is not without difficulty and
complexity.”).
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infants.55 The reasons for such treatment are many and
complex.56 Moreover, the motives underlying such treatment are
often misunderstood and ignored.57 An observer who carefully
studies and considers those motives will quickly conclude,
however, that the motives range from genuine concern for the
perceived best interest of the individual, on the one hand, to a
complete lack of concern for her best interest, on the other.58
When a person is elderly and has a cognitive disability, as is
often the case in settings involving guardianships,
conservatorships, and durable powers of attorney, an even greater
likelihood arises that one or more fiduciaries or other substitute
decision-makers will treat her as a young child.59 The following
discussion suggests a few of the complex and often
interconnected reasons for these tendencies and explores some
possible motives underlying them.60

A. Altruism
The most generous and pervasive motive underlying our
tendency to infantilize the elderly and other adults with a
55. This Article concerns infantilization of an adult who becomes cognitively disabled
in adulthood, thereafter often requiring supported or substitute decision-making by a
guardian, conservator, or agent acting under a durable power of attorney. More often than
not, such disability or incapacity develops, if at all, in older rather than younger adults. For
a discussion of shortcomings in guardian decision-making for persons with impaired
intellectual disability from birth or childhood, see generally Arsenault, supra note 21, at 2533 (noting that guardianship cases most often involve children or the elderly and examining
in particular medical decisions by family (sometimes at the suggestion of medical providers)
that result in decreased screening and treatment for persons with an intellectual disability
existing since childhood).
56. See infra notes 61-147 and accompanying text (discussing reasons and motives for
infantilizing the elderly and adults with diminished capacity).
57. See, e.g., infra notes 104-120 and accompanying text (discussing convenience as
a motivation for infantilization of the elderly and adults with diminished capacity).
58. See infra notes 61-147 and accompanying text (discussing altruism, assumptions,
convenience, ignorance, and self-interest among motives for infantilizing the elderly and
adults with diminished capacity).
59. Although this Article focuses on the tendency of individual substitute decisionmakers to view incapacity and infancy as largely synonymous, the law itself has also
historically infantilized wards under guardianship. See, e.g., Rein, supra note 6, at 1824-25
(noting that an adult under guardianship is, for purposes of most decisions, treated as a child
in the law’s eyes).
60. Although I provide separate discussion of several reasons for such treatment, these
reasons often are not always mutually exclusive. Several of them are in fact almost always
interrelated or intertwined.
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cognitive disability is a genuine concern for those individuals and
a desire to make them feel valued and important.61 Because we
do care about them and consider them important, in conversations
with them we may unwittingly simplify our word choices, change
our inflection, volume, and speed of delivery, and use words of
endearment or encouragement in ways that we would never do in
our conversations with other adults.62 Ironically, our sincere
desire to respect the elderly and adults with a cognitive disability
may result in unwarranted, unconscious paternalism on our part.63
Each ward, conservatee, and principal is unique, of course,
and may want and expect different things from a fiduciary or
others who engage in surrogate decision-making for her.
Nevertheless, what many fiduciaries and surrogate decisionmakers perceive as commendable solicitude for the well-being of
the adult with diminished capacity often will fail to serve the
adult’s best interest if their words and actions reflect an implicit
assumption of omniscience, no matter how kind their underlying
motive.64
In sum, fiduciaries and other surrogate decision-makers
should take care never to let their good intentions lead them to
assume that they inevitably know better than the elder or other
adult with a cognitive incapacity what will best serve her
interest.65 Indeed, as discussed in the following subsection, such
assumptions can be very dangerous.

B. Assumptions
If we happen to serve as the respondent’s lawyer, a factfinding guardian ad litem for the court, or the judge of a
guardianship or conservatorship proceeding, we refuse to assume
61. See infra Part IV (discussing elderspeak and generous motives that may lead to it).
62. See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics of
elderspeak).
63. See, e.g., Pope, supra note 44, at 214, 219 (observing that for various reasons, not
all of which are deliberate, “[s]urrogates are frequently inaccurate in implementing patient
preferences,” and, moreover, substitute decision-makers often are unable to distinguish their
own preferences from those of the person on whose behalf they should be acting).
64. See id. at 215-20 (discussing mediocre performance of substitute decision-makers
in medical futility cases).
65. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1828 (“It takes an especially conscientious and thorough
judge or court investigator to recognize and fend off the misplaced benevolence of some
petitions.”).
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the petitioner’s allegations to be completely true and unbiased.66
We know that respondents are named in such petitions for various
reasons, and the reasons asserted in those petitions may not reflect
the true motives of a petitioner.67 For example, we know that
petitioners are sometimes more concerned about Mama’s money
than about Mama herself.68 We know that some petitions are
based more on intra-family squabbles than on true concern for
Papa’s best interest.69 We know that sometimes petitioners are
seeking to ensure that a respondent-relative lives or acts in
accordance with the petitioners’ religious, ethnic, or cultural
beliefs,70 regardless of what the respondent appears to want or
have wanted.71
Armed with this skepticism about the motives of others, we
may nevertheless assume that our own acts of representing,
questioning, and judging will be free from bias and prejudice.72
Oblivious to our own predilections, we believe that we are
proceeding with caution as we remember the modern mandate of

66. See, e.g., Anderson v. Lasen (In re Conservatorship of Anderson), 628 N.W.2d
233, 239-41 (Neb. 2001) (noting trial court’s concern about daughter’s self-interest in
becoming conservator).
67. See id. (discussing various motives of petitioners that range from those that are
well-intentioned to those involving clear conflicts of interest).
68. In Anderson v. Lasen, 628 N.W.2d 233, the appellate court noted that the trial
court had properly passed over the daughter and son-in-law of an adult with a cognitive
incapacity when naming a conservator for the adult. Id. at 239-41. Even though the daughter
had priority for being named conservator under a state statute, she and her husband had
previously made gifts from the adult’s estate while acting as agents under a power of attorney
that did not permit them to make such gifts. Id. at 239. In light of this, the lower court “had
a reasonable basis for believing that [daughter’s] self-interest in her potential liability as an
attorney in fact would conflict with a fiduciary’s duty of absolute fidelity to [her father’s]
welfare and the interests of his estate.” Id. at 241.
69. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner (In re Estate of Wagner), 367 N.W.2d 736, 737-38,
741 (Neb. 1985) (discussing conservatorship petition filed by several children who disagreed
with elderly parent’s business decision).
70. See, e.g., Conrad v. Atkins (In re Guardianship of Atkins), 868 N.E.2d 878, 88081 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (discussing guardianship case in which mother sought to prevent
son’s longtime homosexual partner from serving as son’s guardian, citing her religious
beliefs).
71. See, e.g., S.I. v. R.S., 877 N.Y.S.2d 860, 863 (Sup. Ct. 2009) (discussing
guardianship petition of respondent’s siblings that sought to void health-care power of
attorney in respondent’s wife, asserting that wife was not acting in accordance with family’s
religious beliefs).
72. See, e.g., In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 652-54 (2d Cir. 1943) (warning
that judges, like others, must examine their biases and prejudices).

16

ARKANSAS LAW REVIEW

Vol. 71:1

maximizing the respondent’s autonomy consistent with her
abilities.73
In fact, perhaps the gravest danger about assumptions is not
that we will assume that the assertions of others are valid, but
rather that we will remain unaware of our own assumptions about
the elderly and other adults with a cognitive disability.74 While
representing, questioning, judging, and making decisions for or
with the assistance of the adult with diminished capacity, are we
failing to adequately examine our own prejudices and biases?75
Are we unwittingly placing ourselves in the shoes of the
respondent and thereby confusing what we would want with what
she actually wants?76 Are we unfairly assuming that we know
best—or at least that we know better than the respondent—what
arrangements will serve her best interest?77 If the answer to these
questions is yes, then we run the risk of devaluing the dignity and
autonomy of the adult with diminished capacity and of treating
her instead as an infant.
Our unacknowledged assumptions may extend to
dichotomous views of “capable” and “incapacitated” adults.
Most of us take for granted that the interests, desires, and even
fundamental beliefs of a capable adult may change over time.78
73. See, e.g., In re Fisher, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (“The integrity of
the elderly, no less than any other group of our citizens, should not be invaded, nor their
freedom of choice taken from them by the state simply because we believe that decisions
could be ‘better’ made by someone else.”).
74. This obliviousness is not limited to guardians, conservators, and agents. It will
often pervade the decisions of attorneys, guardians ad litem, court investigators or visitors,
and judges themselves. See Dayton et al., supra note 24 (discussing biases of judges who
may make decisions based more on intuition than on clearly stated standards).
75. See id.
76. See Pope, supra note 44, at 219 (discussing psychological explanations for
substitute decision-makers’ frequent inability to distinguish their own wishes from those of
the person for whom they are to act).
77. See Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34:24 (warning that “there is always a risk that
a difficult or eccentric respondent will be adjudicated ‘incompetent’ simply because her
behavior does not conform to social norms”).
78. See Ray D. Madoff, Autonomy and End-of-Life Decision Making: Reflections of a
Lawyer and a Daughter, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 963, 965-66 (2005) (noting frequent disparity
between what people think they would want in the face of illness or incapacity and what they
want when they actually face that illness or incapacity); Pope, supra note 44, at 217 (noting
that patient wishes concerning end-of-life care change over time). Another wish that may
change over time for many adults is how their estate should be distributed under a will or
trust. In fact, as I have noted elsewhere, those who bring a conservatorship or guardianship
petition against a relative may find that in response the relative will, or at least will attempt
to, disinherit them. See Brashier, Crystal Balls, supra note 10, at 1-5 (discussing wills
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Yet when the interests, desires, and beliefs of an elder or other
adult with a cognitive disability change, we may implicitly
assume that she is being unduly influenced, suffering from
dementia, or otherwise unable to realize and appreciate the
changes in question.79 Thus, when the ward, conservatee, or
principal expresses a wish that does not perfectly square with
wishes she expressed before the onset of incapacity, surrogate
decision-makers may conclude that the new wishes are not really
hers.80 Family members, for example, may assert openly that
“[M]ama would never want that if she were in her right mind.”81
But do we know as much as we think we do? What is the
source of this supposed superior knowledge that gives us a moral
claim for overriding the decision that an adult with diminished
capacity now apparently wants to make? Several assumptions, all
of which are spurious, come to mind:

1. That we know what they need
When an adult has diminished capacity— especially if she
has diminished capacity and is elderly—too frequently we
assume, implicitly or explicitly, that we “know what she needs,”
executed by person under guardianship or conservatorship). For case examples, see Skelton
v. Davis, 133 So. 2d 432, 434 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (observing terms of mother’s will,
executed following successful curatorship petition brought by two of her daughters, under
which “after prayerful deliberation” she revoked earlier, more generous devises to them and
bequeathed them only $100 each, specifically noting that “[o]f course I resent this action on
their part”); Tank v. Lange (In re Estate of Wagner), 522 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Neb. 1994)
(upholding will of woman who disinherited four of her six children after those four children
unsuccessfully sought to have a conservatorship imposed upon her following death of her
husband); Bottger v. Bottger (In re Bottger’s Estate), 129 P.2d 518, 521 (Wash. 1942)
(observing that mother had become incensed when her children filed guardianship petition
against her, and three days later she executed new will).
79. See, e.g., Wagner, 367 N.W.2d at 741 (discussing conservatorship petition filed
by several children against octogenarian mother alleging undue influence by her other
children after mother made business decision to lease land to third party instead of permitting
petitioners to continue to use land at less than fair market value). In Wagner, the court
concluded that the mother’s decision to “become a better business person” was not evidence
that she required a conservator, even if the decision did work to the economic inconvenience
of some of her children. Id.
80. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705 (noting that family members may
discount the current wishes of a nursing home resident who is incompetent).
81. See, e.g., Wagner, 367 N.W.2d at 741 (discussing “illogical” testimony of
petitioner son that his mother’s recent business decision over leased land demonstrated her
need for a conservator, when in fact that decision would produce a 160% increase in revenue
over what her late husband had received by leasing to petitioner).
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whether those needs involve housing, medication, social
interaction, or anything else relating to her person or finances.82
If we step back and acknowledge this tendency on our part, we
can better recognize and minimize the temptation to substitute
what we believe we would want or need were we in her shoes for
what she indicates she wants or needs.83 Moreover, once we take
that step back, it becomes easier to remember not only that the
law is supposed to serve her best interest, but also that her best

82. Under this approach, the decision-maker asserts (implicitly or explicitly) that he
knows what will best serve the interests of the adult with an incapacity, without regard to the
adult’s known or probable wishes. See, e.g., Nancy J. Knauer, LGBT Issues and Adult
Guardianship, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 7, at
299, 310-11 (discussing decision-making standards and comparing “best interests,”
“substituted judgment,” and the more recent “supported decision-making” standard). The
text of this Article discusses primarily the two older, most commonly encountered standards
in surrogate decision-making—best interests and substituted judgment. Nevertheless, the
overall thrust of the Article is that surrogate decision-makers (1) must cast aside their own
biases and prejudices that conflate incapacity and infancy and (2) must make a meaningful
inquiry into the wants, needs, and desires of the adult with an incapacity, allowing that adult
to make her own decision (perhaps with assistance) whenever possible. See also Alexander
A. Boni-Saenz, Sexuality and Incapacity, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 1201, 1230-33 (2015) (discussing
supported decision-making); Nina A. Kohn et al., Supported Decision-Making: A Viable
Alternative to Guardianship?, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 1111, 1113 (2013) (“The use of
surrogate decision-making and guardianship . . . is coming under increasing criticism from
disability rights advocates and scholars who urge replacing it—or at least supplementing it—
with a process called ‘supported decision-making.’”). Professor Kohn and her co-authors
state as follows:
As a general matter, supported decision-making occurs when an individual
with cognitive challenges is the ultimate decision-maker but is provided
support from one or more persons who explain issues to the individual and,
where necessary, interpret the individual’s words and behavior to determine
his or her preferences. However, some advocates do not use the term
“supported decision-making” this broadly. Instead, they reserve the term for
situations in which the person being supported has voluntarily entered into the
arrangement, and these advocates use terms like facilitated decision-making
and co-decision-making to describe other versions of supported decisionmaking.
Id. at 1120-21.
83. Admittedly, this is not an easy step to take. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 708
(“It is almost impossible for a substitute decisionmaker to take his or her own values and
beliefs out of the decision-making process.”); Pope, supra note 44, at 219 (noting that
surrogates often “cannot distinguish their own preferences from those of the [person for
whom they are the substitute decision-maker]” (quoting Sara M. Moorman & Deborah Carr,
Spouses’ Effectiveness as End-of-Life Health Care Surrogates: Accuracy, Uncertainty, and
Errors of Overtreatment or Undertreatment, 48 GERONTOLOGIST 811, 812 (2008))); see also
infra notes 168-99 and accompanying text (discussing questions that the surrogate should
ask in the decision-making process).
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interest is unlikely to be furthered by a one-size-fits-all pattern
based on what we think a “reasonable” person would do.84

2. That we know how to protect them from
themselves and others
It is easy to look at an adult with diminished capacity and
imagine all of the terrible things that could befall her if we do not
intervene in her life. We think, If I let her smoke, she may set her
surroundings on fire and burn herself to death. Smoking is bad
for her health, anyway. And, speaking of health, I have to watch
her diet, rationing or eliminating those unhealthy foods that she
would choose for herself. I cannot let her control her finances
because there are plenty of evil folks out there just waiting to prey
on someone like her.85 Some of her old friends may also be
inclined to put bad ideas into her head, so I better keep them away
from her, regardless of how much she seems to enjoy their
company.86 And our concerns go on and on.
What we often fail to do, however, is recognize that by
unduly “protecting” her from herself and the world, we once
again may largely be ignoring the integrity of her personhood and
the explicit direction of modern laws to promote her autonomy
where possible.87

84. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1830 (noting that what a ward would want may differ
from what a reasonable prudent person would want).
85. See, e.g., In re McDonnell, 266 So. 2d 87, 88-89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972)
(terminating guardianship order, noting that while ward had made a bad investment and an
uncollectible loan and was inclined to drink to the detriment of her health, she was not likely
to become the victim of designing persons; moreover, no matter how well-intentioned,
ward’s daughters simply had not proved that their mother required a guardianship).
86. Again, ageism is likely to exacerbate an implicit assumption that an adult with a
cognitive incapacity is like a child. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1844 (“Society is unwilling to
tolerate in a seventy-or-eighty-year-old person ‘the same silly decision’ that would go
unchallenged if made by an individual in the prime of her life.” (quoting Arnold J. Rosoff &
Gary L. Gottleib, Preserving Personal Autonomy for the Elderly: Competency,
Guardianship, and Alzheimer’s Disease, 8 J. LEGAL MED. 1, 30 (1987))); see also
Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 703-08 (discussing likelihood of family objections to needs
and desires of nursing home patient suffering from cognitive disability to engage in intimate
or sexual relationships with other patients).
87. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1835 (“[A] perceived loss of control is a prime factor in
producing decline, disorientation, stress, and deterioration of the immune system.”); see also
infra notes 148-67 (discussing more recent studies linking internalization of infantilizing
language among the elderly with substantially shorter life expectancy).
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3. That we know what they would have wanted had
they not become incapacitated
Among the most troubling assumptions asserted by
surrogate decision-makers is that they are choosing what the
incapacitated person would have chosen for herself had she not
become incapacitated.88 The related doctrine—that of substituted
judgment, or making the decision the adult herself would have
made before her incapacity89—is widely recognized as an
important part of guardianship, conservatorship, and power of
attorney laws.90 When the incapacitated person cannot reliably
express her wishes or indicate a preference among various
options, proper application of the doctrine is often the best way
for the decision-maker to respect the continuing personhood of

88. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 703-08 (discussing competing theories
concerning whether decisions for person with diminished capacity should be based on “who
she was” or, instead, “who she is”). The discussion in Tenenbaum’s article suggests that a
bald-faced assertion by the substitute decision-maker that the decision-maker is acting based
on the adult’s prior expressions or preferences does not necessarily mean that the decisionmaker is acting appropriately. Instead, for a substitute decision-maker to use substituted
judgment properly, the decision-maker should consider (1) whether the adult with the
cognitive incapacity can currently express her wishes in a reliable fashion and, if she cannot,
(2) what evidence supports the decision-maker’s assertion that the decision is in accordance
with the adult’s wishes or probable wishes. See also infra note 89 and accompanying text
(discussing “substituted judgment”).
89. In its broadest sense, the doctrine of substituted judgment provides that the
surrogate decision-maker should make decisions based on the known wishes of the adult
with a cognitive disability or in accordance with her probable wishes to the extent that those
wishes can be reasonably ascertained. See, e.g., Nabity v. Rubek (In re Trust Created by
Nabity), 854 N.W.2d 551, 562-63 (Neb. 2014) (quoting Nebraska statute implicitly calling
for substituted judgment by health-care agent); Norman L. Cantor, The Relation Between
Autonomy-Based Rights and Profoundly Mentally Disabled Persons, 13 ANNALS HEALTH
L. 37, 38-41 (2004) (discussing traditional concepts of substituted judgment and questioning
whether a surrogate can ever exercise substituted judgment for a person who has never been
able to make considered choices about end-of-life medical treatment). In fact, not all states
agree on the contours of substituted judgment. Occasionally the traditional view is turned on
its head. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Keresey (In re Conservatorship of Hart), 279 Cal.
Rptr. 249, 264 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing California statute in conservatorship case and stating
that “the question in substituted-judgment proceedings is not what the conservatee would do
but rather what a reasonably prudent person in the conservatee’s position would do”). For a
brief history of the origin and use of the substituted judgment doctrine, see Strunk v. Strunk,
445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969) (citing doctrine’s origins in England and noting that the
doctrine is sufficiently broad to permit decisions relating to both the person and the property
of the adult with diminished capacity).
90. See, e.g., KOHN, supra note 23, at 187-89 (discussing decision-making standards
for surrogates acting as conservators, guardians, agents, or health-care agents).
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the incapacitated individual.91 Decision-makers sometimes
misuse the doctrine, however, to justify a decision that they wish
to make without genuine regard for whether the decision
accurately reflects what the adult with diminished capacity
probably would have done or whether she can currently provide
a reliable expression of her wishes.92

4. That we should discount the wishes and
preferences they now assert
For an adult with diminished capacity who can reliably
express her preferences and wishes,93 the focus of surrogate
decision-makers solely or primarily on what she would have
preferred or wished had she not become incapacitated can
produce unfortunate results that deny the value of the person she
is now.94 By ignoring the preferences and wishes that she
currently expresses clearly and reliably, decision-makers are also
refusing to admit that, whether from incapacity or otherwise, an
individual’s wants and needs can change over time—and that she
may very well still be in the best position to know her wants and
needs.95
Unless surrogate decision-makers are willing to consider,
thoroughly and carefully, the wishes and preferences that the
adult with a cognitive disability currently expresses, they run the
91. See supra notes 88-89 (discussing substituted judgment).
92. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 703-11 (discussing flaws in the use of both
substituted judgment and best interest doctrines).
93. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 791, 797 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1991) (discussing importance of ward’s ability to express her wishes reliably
concerning her desire to live with her lesbian partner).
94. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705-07 (observing that a person’s preferences
may change so substantially after the onset of incapacity that it makes no sense to use
substituted judgment based on what were once the person’s values). When the person with
a cognitive incapacity can and does reliably express wishes or desires that depart from what
she once wanted when she was “fully capable,” blanket use of substituted judgment or a best
interest test seems muddle-headed. On a deeper level, use of either the substituted judgment
doctrine or a best interest test in this scenario may reflect our unwitting view of the person
as someone who is, in essence, already dead. When the person with a cognitive disability is
older, unrecognized bias and prejudice against the elderly may also come into play. See
Rein, supra note 6, at 1842-43 (discussing prejudice against the elderly that may include fear
of our own death as a factor).
95. See, e.g., Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d at 792-93 (observing expert testimony that ward
with very serious cognitive impairment could still express her wishes concerning her
residence and intimate relationships despite the objections of her blood relatives).
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risk of effectively memorializing the person that the incapacitated
adult once was and treating the person she has become as an
unimportant, barely sentient being.96 Such treatment is damaging
to her sense of self-worth and is likely to intensify the frustration
that she may already feel as a result of her cognitive disability.97
In sum, incapacity exists in varying degrees along an
extremely broad spectrum,98 and few of us (whether or not
declared legally incapacitated) are bound forever by what we feel
today.99 The onset of incapacity does not mean that a person’s
“real” self has disappeared.100 Like “capable” adults, elders and
other adults with a cognitive incapacity will often experience
changing views, desires, and preferences over time.101 Stated
bluntly, when an adult with diminished capacity can clearly and
reliably express her current wishes and preferences, a surrogate
should not override those wishes and preferences merely because
the adult’s views were once different.102

C. Convenience
In matters affecting our own lives, we often make decisions
without particular concern about whether we are well-informed
96. Or, in the words of Lawrence Friedman, “[t]he ward is treated as being already
half-dead.” Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savage, Taking Care: The Law of Conservatorship
in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 273, 288 (1988).
97. See In re Conservatorship of Groves, 109 S.W.3d 317, 328 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003)
(observing in conservatorship case the importance of autonomy to the elderly); Rein, supra
note 6, at 1834 (observing ill effects on individual resulting from a perceived loss of control).
98. See Groves, 109 S.W.3d at 333 (“Capacity is not an abstract, all-or-nothing
proposition.”).
99. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705 (discussing change in values that may result
following onset of a disability).
100. Nor does the fact that a “reasonable” person would make a different decision
mean that the decision of the person with a cognitive incapacity is “wrong.” See, e.g., In re
Fisher, 552 N.Y.S.2d 807, 815 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (stating that a belief that someone else could
make a better decision is not a sufficient reason to invade elderly person’s freedom of
choice).
101. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705 (noting the changes that may occur in the
values of a person with a disability and citing evidence that even clinicians may
“significantly underestimate the quality of life possible after a disability” (quoting Sunil
Kothari & Kristi Kirschner, Decision-Making Capacity After TBI: Clinical Assessment and
Ethical Implications, in BRAIN INJURY MEDICINE: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 1216 (Nathan
D. Zasler et al., eds., 2007))).
102. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (discussing then-existing state statute mandating that court consider the preferences of
the respondent in a guardianship proceeding).
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or whether the decision will render the best long-term result for
us; instead, we make decisions that are convenient or desirable at
the moment. In contrast, a surrogate decision-maker’s ongoing
responsibility for determining what is best for an adult with a
cognitive disability is daunting. Careful balancing by a surrogate
of what the adult with diminished capacity desires and needs, on
the one hand, with the surrogate’s ultimate obligation to serve her
best interests, on the other, can be time-consuming, costly, and
emotionally draining for the surrogate.103 Not surprisingly, even
those surrogate decision-makers who care deeply about the
welfare of the adult whom they assist may unwittingly infantilize
that adult to justify expedient decisions.

1. General convenience
By conflating incapacity and infancy, surrogates can
convince themselves (and perhaps others) that their decisions for
the adult with diminished capacity are just and proper.104 They
may rationalize that they need not always thoughtfully evaluate
actual abilities and wishes of the adult on whose behalf they are
to act, especially in light of the potentially mind-numbing number
of decisions they must make for the adult.105 The implicit
assumption is that the surrogate decision-maker is somewhat like
a parent and can—indeed, must—make some decisions for the
adult with a cognitive disability without putting in a great deal of
thought or effort, just as a parent sometimes must do for her
infant.106
Moreover, surrogates have no magical well from which they
can dip unlimited amounts of time. In addition to their
103. Moreover, evidence suggests that many surrogate decision-makers have
difficulty separating their own preferences from those of the person on whose behalf they
should be acting. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that decision-makers
often make a choice based on what they would want).
104. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1829 (noting that convenience to the substitute
decision-maker and others is one factor motivating petitioners to seek guardianships and
conservatorships).
105. See id. at 1829 n.42.
106. The assumption is not always implicit. See Glen, supra note 5, at 115–16 (noting
that “[t]he 1969 Uniform Probate Code provided that a ‘guardian of an incapacitated person
has the same powers, rights and duties respecting his ward that a parent has respecting his
un-emancipated minor child’” and further observing that “fourteen states retain this quite
literally paternalistic standard” (quoting UNIF. PROB. CODE § 5-312 (West 1969))).
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responsibilities to the adult with a cognitive incapacity, often
guardians, conservators, and agents have substantial
responsibilities to their own families and others.107 Judges,
attorneys ad litem, and guardians ad litem must juggle the
demands of other parties in the legal system who demand their
time and attention.108 All of these decision-makers must make
many choices quickly and efficiently. Thus, time constraints may
exacerbate the tendency to infantilize adults with a diminished
capacity.109
A decision-maker may also find it inconvenient to consult
the adult with diminished capacity about a matter that seems of
small consequence to the decision-maker, even when the adult
with diminished capacity seems quite concerned over the
matter.110 In such circumstances, the decision-maker can posit
that the adult with diminished capacity, like an infant, will quickly
forget the matter that seems so important to her in the moment.111
In short, when surrogate decision-makers sufficiently
infantilize the adult with diminished capacity, they can often
maintain a clear conscience while making decisions with much
less circumspection.

2. Emotional convenience
For the guardian, conservator, or agent of an adult with a
cognitive incapacity, the costs associated with promoting the

107. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1851-52, 1859-61 (noting economic obligations of
adult children that may prevent them from giving all the love and support they might wish
to give to their elderly parents).
108. In light of these and other pressures, it is not surprising that unrecognized biases
and prejudices may greatly influence the outcome of surrogate decision-making. See infra
notes 72-75, 88-92 and accompanying text (discussing effect of unwitting bias and
prejudice).
109. Statutory law may also contribute to the infantilization of an adult with a
cognitive incapacity. For example, Mississippi’s conservatorship laws provide that a person
under a conservatorship “shall be limited in his or her contractual powers and contractual
obligations and conveyance powers to the same extent as a minor.” MISS. CODE. ANN. § 9313-261 (2016) (emphasis added).
110. See supra note 105.
111. See, e.g., Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 150 (Ky. 1969) (Steinfeld, J.,
dissenting) (stating that “[i]t is common knowledge beyond dispute that the loss of a close
relative or a friend to a six-year-old child is not of major impact” in case in which adult with
diminished capacity had mental age approximating that of a six year-old).
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autonomy112 of the adult with diminished capacity are more than
merely time intensive.113 The costs often will include significant
demands on the surrogate decision-maker’s own emotions and
psyche.114 Particularly when the surrogate decision-maker is a
family member—which is very often the case—the decisionmaker may be so emotionally attached to the adult with
diminished capacity that the decision-maker cannot make an
objective, carefully-reasoned assessment of the adult’s needs and
expressed wishes.115 In such cases, the decision-maker may take
the easier path of simply “going with his gut” and treating the
adult with a cognitive incapacity as an infant, thereby avoiding an
emotionally draining inquiry concerning how best to respect and
promote her autonomy.116

3. Financial convenience
A thorough assessment of the needs and wishes of an adult
with a cognitive incapacity often has financial implications far
beyond the costs encountered in an actual guardianship or
conservatorship proceeding or in the activation of a durable
112. See supra Part II (discussing modern statutory requirements regarding assisted
decision-making, including the goal of maximizing autonomy consistent with the person’s
ability).
113. The emotional costs may include determining whether the adult with a cognitive
incapacity can reliably express her preferences and the role of a best interest standard when
her preferences deviate from what a reasonable person would do. See, e.g., Linda S. Whitton,
The Uniform Power of Attorney Act: Striking a Balance Between Autonomy and Protection,
1 PHOENIX L. REV. 343, 349-50 (2008) [hereinafter Whitton, Striking a Balance] (observing
that agent must act “according to the principal’s reasonable expectations, if known” and
stating “[t]hus, to the extent a principal’s expectations are known to an agent, the agent may
be authorized to engage in transactions that might not meet a ‘best-interest’ test”). Professor
Whitton was Reporter for the Uniform Power of Attorney Act. Id. at 344 n.9.
114. See KOHN, supra note 23, at 145 (discussing intangible costs associated with the
guardianship process).
115. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 708 (stating that in substitute decision-making,
“[o]ne of the biggest problems is objectivity,” and noting further the near impossibility for
the decision-maker to disregard his own views in making decisions); Pope, supra note 44, at
219 (observing failure of decision-makers to distinguish their own preference from those of
a patient with a cognitive incapacity).
116. It is not only guardians, conservators, and agents who may be inclined to rely
more on intuition rather than on demanding inquiries that promote autonomy and
demonstrate respect for dignity. See, e.g., Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34:25 (noting
paternalistic attitude of some judges and observing that such judges “often develop strong
biases regarding guardianship generally and in specific cases,” ultimately using intuition
more than the standards and procedures contemplated by modern statutory reform).
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power of attorney.117 For example, perhaps the adult with
diminished capacity expresses a desire for a substantial allowance
that she can use as she wishes.118 Perhaps she asserts her wish to
move to a residence that is far more expensive than her current
residence. Perhaps she complains often of various ailments and
wishes to see a doctor for each complaint.
In such circumstances, a surrogate decision-maker may
rationalize that the adult’s costly requests do not represent her true
wishes, but instead are simply ways to seek more attention from
the decision-maker or others.119 The surrogate decision-maker
may thus see little need to “waste” money on the adult’s
requests.120 By viewing her requests as infantile “acting out,” the
decision-maker can also rationalize that what really will serve her
best interests is the preservation of her funds.

D. Ignorance
The preceding discussion—and, indeed, this entire Article—
suggests that a principal “innocent” cause of flawed actions by
surrogate decision-makers is their often-unwitting conflation of
infancy and adult incapacity. This problem exists even when the
surrogate undoubtedly cares about the adult with the incapacity
and is well-intentioned. Surrogate decision-makers—be they
117. See, e.g., Stewart v. Bush (In re Conservatorship of Stallings), 523 So. 2d 49, 5253 (Miss. 1988)
118. See, e.g., id. (discussing and approving an allowance in the form of a checking
account for person under conservatorship and over which account the conservator was to
have no control). The court in Stallings noted as follows:
We begin, therefore, with the underlying reality. Competency is not an
either/or. In considering whether a conservatorship should be established, the
Chancery Court is inevitably in the relative world of shades of gray. Some
persons are so incapable of handling their affairs that a conservator must be
charged to do everything. Yet there are many circumstances where it is neither
necessary nor desirable that the conservator write a check for every tube of
toothpaste or soft drink that the ward may wish to purchase.
Id. at 53 (approving allowance for ward’s use as “he or she sees fit”).
119. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 704-08; Douglas A. Kemerer, How to Manage
Manipulative Behavior in Geriatric Patients, AM. NURSE TODAY, Oct. 2016, at 5-1,
https://www.americannursetoday.com/manage-manipulative-behavior-geriatric-patients/
[https://perma.cc/U87E-8C6D] (describing elderly patients’ capacity for attention-seeking
behaviors).
120. The financial convenience argument can spill over into self-interest on the part
of the substitute decision-maker. See infra Part III.E (discussing decisions of the substitute
decision-maker based on self-interest).
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judges, lawyers, guardians ad litem,121 conservators, guardians, or
agents acting under a power of attorney—simply fail to realize
that they are treating the adult with diminished capacity as an
infant.122
The result of this ignorance is decision-making that flies in
the face of both the letter and the spirit of modern guardianship,
conservatorship, and power-of-attorney statutes.123 Although
most of the aspirational goals underlying these statutes now have
a history of several decades, the statutes have done little to
increase awareness of our historical tendency to combine notions
about incapacity and infancy.124 Unless the surrogate decisionmaker engages in careful self-reflection of his motivations and
attitudes about old age and incapacity, the conflation will likely
continue regardless of the decision-maker’s familiarity with
modern statutory directives.125

E. Self-Interest
Most surrogate decision-makers act in good faith.126 Most
surrogates make choices based on altruistic motives.127
121. The term “guardian ad litem” is increasingly being replaced by either “court
visitor” or “court investigator.” See Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34:21 nn.2-3 (discussing
the role of the guardian ad litem and modern preference in terminology); Wingspan—Second
Nat’l Guardianship Conference, Recommendations, 31 STETSON L. REV. 595, 601 (2002)
(providing in recommendation number 32 that “[t]he term ‘investigator’ or ‘visitor’ be used
instead of guardian ad litem” and noting in its comment that “[t]he term ‘guardian ad litem’
often is confused with the term ‘guardian,’ thus resulting in misunderstanding of roles and
responsibilities”).
122. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1834 (“[T]he benevolence of others may directly
produce dependency, depression and even death.” (quoting George J. Alexander, Remaining
Responsible: On Control of One’s Health Needs in Aging, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 13, 21
(1980))).
123. See supra Part II (discussing requirements of modern statutes concerning
guardianships, conservatorships, and durable powers of attorney).
124. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1824-25 (discussing the view that an incapacitated
adult is essentially a child in the law’s eyes); see also supra notes 21-26 and accompanying
text.
125. See infra Part V (suggesting questions to better ensure that the substitute
decision-maker respects and promotes the autonomy of the adult with a cognitive
incapacity).
126. See supra Parts III.A-.C (discussing altruism, erroneous assumptions, personal
knowledge, convenience, and ignorance as potential bases for conflating incapacity and
infancy).
127. See supra Part III.A (discussing altruism as a basis for infantilizing adults with
diminished capacity).
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Sometimes their decisions spring from erroneous assumptions or
from mistaken beliefs that their knowledge confers upon them
parent-like responsibility.128 Like parents of infants, they also
may make some decisions based on convenience.129 In all of
these instances, surrogate decision-makers are often unaware of
their own biases and prejudices130 and ignorant of the modern
statutory demands regarding fiduciary obligations to the adult
with a cognitive incapacity.131
The role of surrogate decision-makers—a role many
surrogates undertake without payment—can be extremely
challenging. Well-intentioned decision-makers can and do often
make bad decisions.132 From the stance of the incapacitated adult,
however, it may matter little whether the substitute decisionmaker’s choice springs from good or bad motives.133 To the adult
on whose behalf the decision is made, an erroneous decision
concerning her welfare is an erroneous decision.134 Though such

128. See supra Part III.B (discussing erroneous assumptions and mistaken beliefs as
bases for infantilizing adults with diminished capacity).
129. See supra Part III.C (discussing convenience as a basis for infantilizing adults
with diminished capacity).
130. In fact, one very important decision-maker often likely to succumb, unwittingly,
to internal bias is the judge in the guardianship or conservatorship proceeding. See Dayton
et al., supra note 24, § 34:25 (discussing paternalistic attitude of some judges and noting
“[t]hey often develop strong biases regarding guardianship generally and in specific cases,”
ultimately using intuition more than the standards and procedures contemplated by modern
statutory reform).
131. See supra Part III.D (discussing ignorance as a basis for infantilizing adults with
diminished capacity); see also Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34.25 (suggesting that some
judges, while perhaps not ignorant of the standards and procedures of modern reform
statutes, may nevertheless ignore them in favor of intuitive decisions based on bias and
prejudice).
132. See Russ ex rel. Schwartz v. Russ, 734 N.W.2d 874, 889 (Wis. 2007)
(Abrahamson, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he problems involving durable powers of attorney do
not arise just from the acts of selfish and conniving agents.”). Chief Justice Abrahamson
further observes that problems also arise from agent uncertainty as to their powers, and that
frequent lack of guidance in statutes and case law compound these problems. Id.; see also
Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 704-05 (noting how family members may have “a distorted
perception” of the values of their relative who has a cognitive disability).
133. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Braaten, 502 N.W.2d 512, 524 (N.D. 1993)
(Vande Walle, C.J., concurring) (recognizing sincere concern of the family for the
respondent’s well-being in opinion that nonetheless refused family’s request for plenary
guardianship and conservatorship).
134. Modern statutory reform, which favors or mandates limited guardianships and
conservatorships over plenary ones and often favors the use of substituted judgment over a
best interests test when possible, seeks to reduce the likelihood of such questionable
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decisions are unfortunate, society and the law must forgive at
least some of the surrogate decision-maker’s errors in judgment.
No one can guarantee the adult with a cognitive incapacity a
record of perfect decision-making by the surrogate.
In contrast to the well-intentioned but imperfect decisionmaker is the cunning decision-maker135 who knowingly acts in
his own interest.136 The self-serving surrogate is far more likely
than the good faith decision-maker to appear in reported case
law137 as he tries to deny or justify his self-interested actions.138
decisions. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Mikulanec, 356 N.W.2d 683, 686-87 (Minn. 1984)
(discussing statutory reform springing in part from the fear of bad decisions by guardians).
135. Determining what constitutes blatant self-interest may not always be simple.
Sometimes a court and the substitute decision-maker may disagree concerning whether the
substitute decision-maker’s actions are serving the adult with a cognitive incapacity.
Sometimes family members of the adult are in such disagreement that a court may feel
compelled to appoint a neutral third party as substitute decision-maker. See, e.g., Linda L. v.
Collis (In re Guardianship of Catherine P.), 718 N.W.2d 205, 222-23 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006)
(appointing neutral guardian and removing daughter as guardian of her mother’s person
where daughter put “her own self-interests above those of her ward,” had failed ward “by
refusing to cooperate with the circuit court in obtaining information,” had “substantially
limited her brother’s access to the mother, and had acted in a way causing substantial stress
to the mother”).
136. See, e.g., DeBoer v. Senior Bridges of Sparks Family Hosp., 282 P.3d 727, 72930, 732 (Nev. 2012) (discussing abuse of power of attorney by agent who allegedly
appropriated principal’s money, real property, and other assets); In re Jumper, 984 A.2d
1232, 1236, 1238-39, 1251-54 (D.C. 2009) (discussing guardianship petition filed by
beneficiary of elderly person’s trust after beneficiary learned that elder had changed her trust
terms in ways significantly less beneficial to him); see also Julia Calvo Bueno, Reforming
Durable Power-of-attorney statutes to Combat Financial Exploitation of the Elderly, 16
NAELA Q. 20, 20-21 (2003) (pointing to studies suggesting a significant amount of financial
abuse occurs through powers of attorney), cited in Deboer, 282 P.3d at 732.
137. See, e.g., Mowrer v. Eddie (In re Guardianship of Mowrer), 979 P.2d 156, 158,
163 (Mont. 1999) (dismissing guardianship petition by niece and her husband against
centenarian aunt, noting substantial transfers couple had made to themselves and their family
from aunt’s assets, observing also misuse of power of attorney by couple, and upholding
lower court finding of undue influence by couple). Indeed, the self-serving decision-maker
was also among the subjects of media attention that led to a number of the modern reforms
in guardianship and conservatorship law. See, e.g., Mikulanec, 356 N.W.2d at 686-87
(noting statutory reform that sprang from “[c]ase studies chronicl[ing] guardians acting as
conmen to obtain the guardianship and discount wholesalers to dispose of their wards’
estates” and also from “a suspicion that guardians are too often less than benevolent”).
138. Agents acting under a durable power of attorney are typically free from the
constraints of judicial review that (at least according to statute) are to occur periodically for
guardianships and conservatorships. Thus, a principal should take extreme care in
designating an agent, and should consider privately-imposed constraints in the power of
attorney document itself. See generally Whitton, Durable Powers, supra note 7, at 10-38
(discussing how the protectiveness of a power of attorney depends upon the trustworthiness
of the agent).
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When the facts are fully presented, however, the selfish motives
of the substitute decision-maker (who is very often a family
member) are revealed.139 Most commonly the substitute
decision-maker who acts primarily in his interest does so for
financial reasons.140 For example, if the substitute decisionmaker is an expectant heir or will receive the residue of the estate
under the will of the adult with a cognitive incapacity, he may
very well line his pockets for increased future benefits by
spending less of the financial resources of the adult with a
cognitive incapacity on satisfying her needs and wishes.141
A decision that incidentally benefits the agent, guardian, or
conservator is not necessarily at odds with respecting and
promoting the autonomy and best interest of the incapacitated
adult.142 For example, if the incapacitated adult reliably expresses
an informed preference to sell her home and move to a less
expensive residential facility where many of her friends live, her
estate may be larger as a result; the substitute decision-maker

139. Sometimes these efforts are all too transparent. See supra note 81 (discussing
Wagner v. Wagner (In re Estate of Wagner), 367 N.W.2d 736 (Neb. 1985), in which
petitioners asserted as evidence of mother’s need for conservator fact that mother decided to
stop leasing to them and instead to lease land to a third party for 160% more than petitioners
had paid). In In re Wagner, the court stated that it is “abundantly clear that one may not have
his or her property taken away and placed in the hands of a conservator merely because
potential heirs believe that there will be more left for them if the owner of the property is not
free to deal with the property as he or she chooses.” 367 N.W.2d at 738.
140. Not surprisingly, most reported case law concerning fiduciary representation
concerns questions about the financial resources of the adult with a cognitive incapacity.
See, e.g., Mowrer, 979 P.2d at 158 (discussing transfers of principal’s property by her agents
to themselves and their family members under durable power of attorney).
141. See, e.g., Joseph A. Rosenberg, Regrettably Unfair: Brooke Astor and the Other
Elderly in New York, 30 PACE L. REV. 1004, 1031-35, 1052-59 (2010) (discussing son’s
financial abuse as agent under his wealthy mother’s power of attorney and how lawyers
assisted agent’s misconduct). In In re Estate of Raney, 799 P.2d 986, 995-96 (Kan. 1990), a
testator disinherited his children who had successfully filed a conservatorship against him.
In upholding the will against a charge that it was tainted by testator’s insane delusion, the
court stated, “Decedent [testator] may have been mistaken in his belief that the conservators
were attempting to control his affairs to preserve their inheritance, but their conduct
supported his belief, even if it was erroneous.” Id. at 996.
142. See In re Estate of Scrivani, 455 N.Y.S.2d 505, 510-11 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (“When
a fiduciary does not have an interest adverse to that of his ward, a fiduciary is not disqualified
solely because he himself may benefit along with his ward from the decision sought to be
taken.”).
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could rightly choose to follow her wishes even if the decision is
likely to provide him with a larger inheritance from her estate.143
In gauging the propriety of the decision made by the agent,
guardian, or conservator, it is often helpful, though not always
necessary,144 to examine the motivating factor behind the
decision.145 If the “but for” factor is the surrogate’s own gain or
benefit—and particularly if the surrogate is a guardian or
conservator—then typically he has violated his fiduciary
obligation.146 Seeking to avoid such an allegation, the clever
surrogate may find it easier to argue that the adult with a cognitive
incapacity, like an infant, had no ability to express her wishes or
preferences, and thus that he was simply acting as he believed she
would want him to.147
143. See Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 113, at 349-50 (discussing
mandatory and permissive acts by agent under durable power of attorney, noting that
principal may want agent to “carry out donative activities that do not represent any direct
‘best-interest’ benefit to the principal” and that “might even include transactions that benefit
the agent or agent’s family”).
144. Some actions by substitute decision-makers are per se violations of their fiduciary
duty, regardless of the decision-maker’s motives. See, e.g., Saunders v. Thomas (In re Estate
of Thomas), 853 So. 2d 134, 135-36 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (setting aside deeds from ward
to conservator, noting that conservator has same fiduciary obligation of loyalty as does a
trustee); In re Brownell, 447 N.Y.S.2d 591, 593-94 (Del. Cty. Ct. 1981) (observing that
conservator’s fee for dog care—paid to herself without court approval—breached the
fiduciary prohibition against self-dealing, regardless of whether her motive was tainted by
fraud or self-interest).
145. See, e.g., Neb. Dep’t Health & Human Servs. v. Gilmore (In re Guardianship of
Gilmore), 662 N.W.2d 221, 226 (Neb. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that sometimes “unscrupulous
relatives need supervision” and “[f]requently, a neighbor, an old friend, the child of an old
friend, a member of the clergy, a banker, a lawyer, a doctor, or someone else who has been
professionally acquainted with the person needing such help will come forward out of simple
charity and bring the matter to the attention of the local probate court”). Of course, finding
a seemingly appropriate person to serve as guardian can be difficult. In Gilmore, the court
put the matter succinctly: “Sometimes, persons in need of a guardian or conservator have
no relatives or at least none that care. Sometimes, the relatives of such people are prevented
from serving the best interests of the protected person by avarice, greed, self-interest,
laziness, or simple stupidity.” Id.
146. See, e.g., In re Leising, 4 P.3d 586, 587, 590 (Kan. 2000) (suspending lawyer
from practice of law where, as conservator and guardian for person with a cognitive
incapacity, lawyer misappropriated funds for his own use), reinstatement granted, 175 P.3d
221 (Kan. 2008). But see Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 113, at 349-50 (noting
that a principal may give her agent broad powers that allow agent to make decisions that
primarily serve the agent’s interests).
147. Sometimes a petitioner will seek a guardianship or conservatorship over another
adult to prevent that adult from making a decision that will have an adverse financial effect
on the petitioner. See, e.g., Wagner v. Wagner (In re Estate of Wagner), 367 N.W.2d 736,
740-41 (Neb. 1985) (concluding that despite petition brought by adult children, no
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IV. CONFLATING INFANCY AND INCAPACITY: ON
KILLING WITH KINDNESS
For many years, experts have been telling us that our
tendency to infantilize the elderly, even when the tendency
springs from generous motives, can harm the elderly.148 Studies
have confirmed what common sense tells us: our words affect
those with whom we speak.149 Moreover, treating the elderly as
children can result not only in psychological harm to the elderly,
but also in physiological harm.150
Perhaps one of the clearest manifestations of our tendency to
treat the elderly as infants is the widespread use of
“elderspeak.”151 Thus, a young or middle-aged speaker who
would never dream of casually calling another young or middleaged person “sweetie” or “dear” might easily use those terms with
an older adult, believing that such usage is kind or encouraging.152
Such language, however, often carries with it the speaker’s
implicit assumption that the elder person is, in some ways, as
helpless as an infant.153 Adults with diminished capacity who
conservator was needed for their elderly mother who made land-leasing decision in favor of
third party that adversely affected some of the petitioners who had previously used land).
An agent, conservator, or guardian may also act in ways to preserve or increase the estate of
the person with an incapacity not to benefit that person, but rather to ensure a larger potential
inheritance for the agent, conservator, or guardian. See, e.g., Lauren Krohn, Cause of Action
to Establish Involuntary Conservatorship for Estate of Adult Person, in 6 CAUSES OF
ACTION 2D 625, § 4, Westlaw (database updated Mar. 2018) (noting closer scrutiny given to
conservatorship petition when inference arises that petitioner is seeking to preserve assets
“in order to secure a larger inheritance,” and also citing cases supporting proposition).
148. See, e.g., John Leland, In “Sweetie” and Dear,” a Hurt Beyond Insult for the
Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2008, at A1 (discussing the harmful effects of “elderspeak”).
149. See id. at A1, A18 (noting studies indicating negative effect of elderspeak).
150. See id. (citing study by Yale professor and noting that an elder’s negative views
of aging may be compounded by the perceived insults of elderspeak, leading to impaired
functional health and lower survival rates over time); Camille Peri, What I Wish I’d Known
About “Elderspeak”: Psychologist Becca Levy, https://www.caring.com/reflections/beccalevy-reflection [https://perma.cc/K4MY-XCDH] (noting that elderspeak can affect the
competence and lifespan of elders).
151. See Leland, supra note 148, at A18 (discussing prevalence of elderspeak,
especially in the field of health care). In addition, researchers have questioned the practice
of “speaking needlessly slowly and loudly” to the elderly. See Barry Wigmore, Talking to
Old People Like Children Cuts Eight Years Off Their Lives, Says Yale Study, DAILY MAIL
(Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1071891/Talking-old-people-likechildren-cuts-years-lives-says-Yale-study.html [https://perma.cc/C9QD-NYRZ].
152. See Leland, supra note 148, at A1 (noting observation by one elder that people
who use elderspeak “think they are being nice . . . but when I hear it, it raises my hackles”).
153. See id. at A18.
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have a surrogate decision-maker usurping at least some of their
autonomy are already in a vulnerable position; thus, the negative
effects of elderspeak are likely to be compounded when
elderspeak is addressed to them.154
Some observers have suggested that health care workers
(including doctors)—arguably those individuals who should be
most aware of the harmful effects of infantilizing the elderly155—
are among the most frequent users of elderspeak.156 If this is so,
one can only wonder at the degree of harm substitute decisionmakers may unwittingly inflict on adults with a cognitive
incapacity outside of the medical arena.
Many elders who are under a guardianship or
conservatorship or who need the assistance of an agent under a
durable power of attorney are quite able to understand the implicit
insult of casual elderspeak addressed to them.157 A fully capable
elder who is the subject of elderspeak may grow livid and inform
the speaker that such language is inappropriate and
unappreciated.158 A person aware that she suffers from some
degree of cognitive incapacity, however, is perhaps less likely to
object clearly and vocally to the elderspeak and more likely to
internalize such language, leading to a “negative downward
spiral” of “decreased self-esteem, depression, withdrawal and the

154. Society tends to infantilize not only the elderly, but also those with disabilities.
See Kenneth L. Robey et al., Implicit Infantilizing Attitudes About Disability, 18 J.
DEVELOPMENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITIES 441, 441-42 (2006) (discussing studies in
which individuals unwittingly altered speech in infantilizing manner when dealing with a
person with a disability); Jennifer L. Stevenson et al., Infantilizing Autism, DISABILITIES
STUD. Q. (2011), http://dsq-sds.org/ article/view/1675/1596 [https://perma.cc/89XZNXV4]. Stevenson and her co-authors observed that “[s]ociety’s overwhelming proclivity
for depicting autism as a disability of childhood poses a formidable barrier to the dignity and
well-being of autistic people of all ages.” Id.
155. See Leland, supra note 148, at A18 (noting that many people do not realize that
“it’s belittling to call someone [dear],” and that “even among professionals, there appeared
to be little movement to reduce elderspeak”).
156. See id. (noting observations of a University of Kansas associate professor who is
a nurse gerontologist). Considering the lack of training that the typical law student receives
in working with elderly clients and adults with diminished capacity, one wonders if lawyers
are likely to be any more aware of the potential harms of elderspeak.
157. See id.
158. See id. (observing that one elderly interviewee “sprinkles her conversation with
profanities” to indicate to others that “[t]his is someone to be reckoned with”). But see id.
(noting that some older individuals do not object to elderspeak and instead view it as a sign
of “underlying warmth” or a “way to connect, in a positive way”).
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assumption of dependent behaviors.”159 In fact, research
indicates that individuals with positive attitudes about aging live
“on average 7.5 years longer than those with a negative
attitude.”160
Elderspeak is thus yet another form of pernicious
infantilization that can exacerbate an elder’s negative view of the
aging process.
Moreover, although the term elderspeak
implicates language addressed to the elderly, it appears that the
use of such improper, too-familiar language has a negative effect
on an adult of any age who suffers a disability.161 Whether elderly
or not, most adults with a cognitive incapacity in fact want what
modern laws ostensibly require: to maximize their autonomy162
consistent with their abilities.163 Yet if health-care professionals
all too often infantilize the adult with a cognitive disability, it
should come as no surprise that judges, lawyers, conservators,
agents, guardians, and guardians ad litem may also unwittingly
adopt infantilizing attitudes and base their decisions on the
underlying, if unspoken, premise that incapacity renders a person
infant-like.164
159. See id. (discussing findings of Dr. Kristine Williams and other researchers
studying how those with mild to moderate dementia react to elderspeak); Wigmore, supra
note 151 (noting that “[f]or people with mild to moderate dementia, the results of elderspeak
were even more alarming” than the results of elderspeak addressed to fully capable elders,
and quoting Dr. Williams’ statement, “If you know you’re losing your cognitive abilities and
trying to maintain your dignity, and someone talks to you like a baby, it’s upsetting to you”).
160. See Wigmore, supra note 151 (observing that the 7.5 years increase in life span
for those with a positive attitude about aging is larger than the lifespan increase “provided
by . . . frequent exercise or not smoking”).
161. See Robey et al., supra note 154, at 441-42 (discussing study in which college
students addressed other adults, whom they believed to have a disability, as children,
speaking louder and using more words); Stevenson et al., supra note 154 (noting that adults
with disabilities are treated as “childlike entities” who “deserv[e] fewer rights and incur[]
greater condescension than [other] adults,” and also observing the disturbing stereotype of
the “eternal child”).
162. See Dayton et al., supra note 24, § 34:32 (noting that uniform laws and most
states now provide for limited guardianships or conservatorships by statute or practice).
163. Moreover, maximum autonomy consistent with ability is perhaps not only what
the typical person wants, but also what the typical person needs. See, e.g., MARTIN E.P.
SELIGMAN, LEARNED OPTIMISM 168-70 (1991) (citing Yale study indicating that nursing
home patients with more choice and control were happier and more active, and discussing
study demonstrating that “learned helplessness” is a psychological state that can cause
cancer).
164. Perhaps truly listening to the elderly is the most generous and genuinely
respectful thing we can do in the process of substitute decision-making. See infra notes 18192 and accompanying text (discussing questions that substitute decision-maker should
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In short, erroneous assumptions about incapacity, age, and
infancy may manifest themselves in spoken words of apparent
endearment. Good intentions, however, do not make such usage
appropriate. Addressing an adult with a cognitive incapacity in
infantilizing terms may contribute to a loss of self-esteem and to
an increase in dependent behaviors.165 As a result, the adult may
come to believe that her wishes and preferences are not worthy of
consideration.166 To the extent that such infantilizing language
may shorten the life expectancy of an adult with a cognitive
incapacity, we would also do well to realize that while
infantilizing words may not break bones, even when kindly meant
they can kill.167

V. THE PARAMOUNT QUESTIONS
To avoid conflating incapacity and infancy, an important
initial step is to recognize clearly our own biases and prejudices
about incapacity (and old age, when the adult with diminished
capacity is elderly).168 Perhaps we cannot completely eliminate
always ask adult with a cognitive incapacity). In his touching memoir of his life with his
mother and especially of her final days, Scott Simon notes that his mother “didn’t like being
dismissed as adorable or cute by younger people, as if she were a five-year-old . . . .” SCOTT
SIMON, UNFORGETTABLE: A SON, A MOTHER, AND THE LESSONS OF A LIFETIME 196
(2015). As her death approaches, she states, “No one really listens to old people. We make
people nervous.” Id. at 18. Later she states from her hospital room that “what is hard” is
that “[t]here’s a tone in their voice when you get old and people call you ‘lovely’ . . . [l]ike
you’ve become some kind of beautiful, crumbling old statue.” Id. at 44. Finally, she states,
“No one wants to listen to old people.” Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
165. See Leland, supra note 148, at A18.
166. See id.; David Solie, Elderspeak: Annoying and Toxic, DAVID SOLIE: SECONDHALF LIFE BLOG (July 6, 2016), http://www.davidsolie.com/ blog/elderspeak-annoyingand-toxic/ [https://perma.cc/M6NW-DZX9].
167. The good news is that the negative impact of elderspeak and infantilizing
language apparently can be reduced by educating those who work with the elderly or with
adults with cognitive disabilities. See Kristine Williams et al., Improving Nursing Home
Communication: An Intervention to Reduce Elderspeak, 43 GERONTOLOGIST 242, 243, 24647
(2003),
https://
academic.oup.com/gerontologist/
article/43/2/242/636164
[https://perma.cc/HY8Y-TQNP] (discussing results of study designed to educate health care
workers about the potential negative effects of elderspeak).
168. Again I emphasize that bias or prejudice can unwittingly taint the choices of
various decision-makers in matters relating to guardianships, conservatorships, and powers
of attorney. For example, the unconscious assumptions of medical or psychological experts
may come into play when they are asked to determine whether an adult is incapacitated for
purposes of instituting a guardianship or conservatorship or determining whether a springing
durable power of attorney has become effective. See also Dayton et al., supra note 24, §
34:22 (noting historically that “the use of a single, possibly biased medical report had the
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those biases and prejudices, but even mere acknowledgement of
our own limitations makes us more likely to see the incapacitated
person as a unique individual and not as an archetype we
unwittingly hold in our mind’s eye.169
If we first thoroughly engage in this self-reflective process
and if we are then also willing to imagine ourselves in an
incapacitated state, we are more likely to understand how
infantilization robs the adult with diminished capacity not only of
autonomy, but also of self-esteem and dignity. We also realize
better that even though she may be incapacitated to some extent,
she nevertheless will often be able to reliably express her wishes
about who will assist her, where she will live, what activities she
will engage in, and with whom she will associate.170 We begin to
discard the notion that we are caring, rational, and “fully capable”
adults who know better than the adult with diminished capacity
what she needs. When we reach this phase in our own
understanding of incapacity,171 we can then turn our focus to

potential for enormous unfairness to the respondent”). Such a medical report may still have
significant adverse repercussions for the respondent even after the statutory reforms of recent
decades.
169. Judge Jerome Frank wrote eloquently about the effect of such selfacknowledgment in the following passage from In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 65254 (2d Cir. 1943):
In addition to . . . social value judgments, every judge, however, unavoidably
has many idiosyncratic “learnings of the mind,” uniquely personal prejudices,
which may interfere with his fairness at a trial. He may be stimulated by
unconscious sympathies for, or antipathies to, some of the witnesses, lawyers
or parties in a case before him. . . . Frankly to recognize the existence of such
prejudices is the part of wisdom. The conscientious judge will, as far as
possible, make himself aware of his biases of this character, and, by that very
self-knowledge, nullify their effect . . . ; the sunlight of awareness has an
antiseptic effect on prejudices. Freely avowing that he is a human being, the
judge can and should, through self-scrutiny, prevent the operation of this class
of biases. . . . As a fact-finder, he is himself a witness—a witness of the
witnesses; he should, therefore, learn to avoid the errors which, because of
prejudice, often affect those witnesses.
Id. at 652-53 (emphasis added). Importantly, Judge Frank’s opinion notes that a judge must
also examine the attitudes, motives, and biases of witnesses as well as the “real purposes and
motives” of lawyers involved in the proceeding. Id. at 654.
170. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 709-12.
171. See FRANK, supra note 17, at 153 (stating that “[t]he best we can hope for” is that
those who judge “become more sensitive, more nicely balanced, more subject to [their] own
scrutiny, more capable of detailed articulation”) (emphasis added).
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those particularized wants and needs of the incapacitated person,
taking into account that person’s abilities.172
The often competing, though sometimes complementary,
doctrines of best interest and substituted judgment173 do not
disappear as we engage in this reflective process. Instead, by
tempering our natural impulse to choose what we think is best for
the adult with diminished capacity174 (whether we are purporting
to act from an objective stance as a reasonable person or from a
subjective stance based on what we believe she would want), we
employ these doctrines in more enlightened and meaningful
ways. We respect more fully the capabilities of the adult with a
cognitive incapacity, increasing the likelihood that we will assist
in maximizing her autonomy and self-esteem. We no longer
assume, for example, that for every adult with a cognitive
incapacity a reputable assisted living facility or nursing home
(providing three hot meals a day and a climate-controlled room)
is a better housing option than the somewhat haphazard
circumstances that may exist at the adult’s own home.175 This is
so even when a “reasonable” person would choose the assisted
living facility or nursing home and even when we would choose
the assisted living facility or nursing home for our self.176

172. I am not suggesting that a substitute decision-maker will always be able to rid
himself of his biases and prejudices concerning age and incapacity. See Tenenbaum, supra
note 35, at 708 (expressing belief that decision-maker can almost never take his own values
and beliefs completely out of the decision-making process); Pope, supra note 44, at 219
(citing failure of decision-maker to separate his own preferences from those of person for
whom he is making decision). I am suggesting that candid self-awareness of the decisionmaker’s biases and prejudices can help minimize the intrusiveness of those biases and
prejudices in the decision-making process. See FRANK, supra note 17, at 148 (observing that
justice is more likely to be accomplished when a judge recognizes “his own prejudices and
weaknesses,” and that while a judge cannot eliminate his personality, he can recognize these
prejudices and weaknesses).
173. See Whitton, Striking a Balance, supra note 113, at 349-50 (noting potential
conflicts between substituted judgment and best interest doctrines).
174. See supra notes 114-15, 126-34 and accompanying text (discussing tendency for
decision-maker to select choices he would want or he thinks best, despite contrary evidence
of the preferences or probable wishes of the adult with a cognitive incapacity).
175. See Rein, supra note 6, at 1834-36.
176. See id. (quoting George J. Alexander, Remaining Responsible: On Control of
One’s Health Needs in Aging, 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 13, 21 (1980)) (noting the profound
meaning of home, its connection with who one is and how one expresses herself, and its
importance for a sense of autonomy and self-control).
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To be clear, this Article does not suggest that every adult
with a cognitive incapacity be left to fend for herself. 177 The
Article does emphasize, however, that increased respect for the
adult with a cognitive incapacity is likely to contribute to her
sense of dignity and self-worth and, further, that increased
recognition of our own biases and prejudices will help us better
assist those who have a cognitive incapacity.178
A one-size-for-all solution is unlikely ever to be appropriate
for every adult with a cognitive incapacity.
Although
individualized solutions can be resource intensive, each adult
with a cognitive incapacity deserves at least the opportunity to
have her wishes considered.179 Indeed, the recurrent theme of this
Article is that we should tailor assisted decision-making around
the individualized wants and needs of each adult with a cognitive
incapacity and that to do so we must first examine our own
preconceptions about elderly and other adults with diminished
capacity.180
Once we recognize that the adult with diminished capacity
can often reliably express her needs and preferences, we are more
likely to realize that certain questions should never go unasked
regarding any matter of significance to her.181 The simple,
foundational question we must ask the adult with diminished
capacity is, “What do you want?”182 Of course, matters
177. For example, if the life of an adult with a cognitive incapacity is endangered by
another, a court or other substitute decision-maker might properly refuse to permit that other
person from visiting the adult, despite the adult’s stated wish to continue to see that other
person. See, e.g., Knight v. Knight (In re Knight), 317 P.3d 1068, 1070, 1073-74 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2014) (discussing petitions by son with power of attorney seeking guardianship for
vulnerable mother and a protective order that would prohibit his brother from visiting her,
even though mother maintained that she did not want visits to stop).
178. See In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1943) (“[T]he sunlight of
awareness has an antiseptic effect on prejudices.”).
179. This approach may also require the substitute decision-maker to admit that the
adult with diminished capacity has indeed become a new and different person whose wishes
and desires are worthy of respect. See, e.g., Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705-06 (discussing
theorists’ views on personhood before and after “disruption in memory or other
psychological connections”).
180. See FRANK, supra note 17, at 148 (“The honest, well-trained judge with the
completest possible knowledge of the character of his powers and of his own prejudices and
weaknesses is the best guaranty of justice.” (emphasis added)).
181. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text (discussing questions that
decision-maker should ask of person with a cognitive incapacity).
182. Cf. Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 713 (proposing, as first step of test for
determining whether a nursing home patient with a cognitive incapacity should be allowed
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significantly affecting her life and well-being can run the gamut.
For example, perhaps the matter concerns who should serve as
her guardian or conservator. Perhaps the matter concerns where
she will live.183 In any event, we should begin by asking her what
she wants.184 If she can reliably express her wishes, those wishes
should be our starting point for decision-making, and her wishes
should be countermanded only with reluctance after careful
consideration.185
Following her answer to our initial question, often we may
have to ask, “Why do you want that?” Our goal with this question
is to assure ourselves that she is expressing her wishes in a
meaningful, reliable way. We should not be looking for carefully
reasoned answers, but rather for answers that demonstrate that she
has a basic understanding of the issue and a preference—a
preference that is reasonable to her—concerning its resolution.186
When she answers these questions in an unexpected way, we
must not rush to conclude that she can no longer reliably express

to engage in an adulterous or other sexual relationship, that decision-maker “determine
whether the resident has the ability to express his or her desires”).
183. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of Lanoue, 802 A.2d 1179, 1181 (N.H. 2002)
(noting that state statute provides that, unless modified by court order, guardian of ward can
select the ward’s residence within or without the state).
184. Because a person with a cognitive incapacity may be able to express reliably her
wishes and needs in ways that cannot be reconciled with instructions she made before the
incapacity, the question should always be asked. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 705-07
(noting how person with an incapacity may become a totally new and different self following
onset of incapacity and may thus also find new and different wishes and needs she never
contemplated before the onset of incapacity).
185. See, e.g., In re Medworth, 562 N.W.2d 522, 523-25 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997)
(reversing trial court’s grant of conservator petition to move conservatee who required 24hour medical care from her home when record showed conservatee had lived there for many
years, had “repeatedly expressed her preference to remain [in that home,]” and was willing
to have her assets spent to allow her to remain there); see also Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at
713-14 (opining that adult with cognitive incapacity may be able to express her desires or
wishes through behavior even if she can no longer express herself orally).
186. Concerning how guardians might go about demonstrating that they have
responsibly fulfilled their roles, see generally Erica Wood, Guardian Accountability: Key
Questions and Promising Practices, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON ADULT
GUARDIANSHIP, supra note 7, at 313, 318 (“Perhaps accountable guardians should show they
have inquired, and have ‘dug deeply’ to find out what is and was important to the individual,
and have made this a part of their plan of action—essentially that ‘attention has been paid’
and that it affected the steps the guardian took.”).
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her wishes.187 This is so even when we know that her answers are
inconsistent with the answers she would have given before the
incapacity began. “Capable” adults may experience a significant
change in their longest- and most strongly-held beliefs and
desires; the same is true of adults with diminished capacity.188
We as substitute decision-makers must not diminish her
personhood by denying her the opportunity to grow and change.
If we focus solely on “who she was” prior to incapacity and ignore
“who she is” now, we fail to recognize her as a human being fully
worthy of respect.189 A refusal by us to consider her currently
expressed preferences comes close to a tacit admission that the
person with an incapacity before us now—who continues to live
and breathe and to have wants and desires—is essentially dead to
us.190
As we carefully consider the wants and needs she expresses,
we do not renounce our duty to serve her best interest. Rather,
when her wishes clash with our expectations, we should
remember the limitations of our knowledge and judgment as well
as the importance of free will and control to every sentient
individual. We can then proceed to a reasoned decision not as
patronizing, parent-like figures, but as caring human beings
assisting another human being to maximize her happiness and
sense of self-worth.191 In short, we reject the notion that
incapacity is infancy.192
187. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 713-14 (discussing individual’s ability to
express his or her desires, noting further that “desires need not be communicated orally; they
can be communicated through a consistent pattern of behavior”).
188. See id. at 705.
189. See id. at 705-07 (warning that following onset of incapacity, “a person’s values
and desires may change so much . . . that it no longer makes sense to base decisions on the
person’s prior values”).
190. See supra notes 93-102 and accompanying text (discussing refusal by surrogate
decision-maker to consider current wishes of adult with diminished capacity).
191. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 713-14 (opining that once adult with incapacity
has expressed her wishes, whether orally or by behavior, the next step is for the decisionmaker “to determine what critical interests or values might be affected by [allowing the adult
to act] on these desires”).
192. Essentially what I advocate is that the substitute, surrogate, or assisted decisionmaker cast aside his own biases and prejudices and carefully examine and respect the
continuing capabilities of the adult with a cognitive incapacity. Such an approach would go
far towards the accomplishment of a person-centered philosophy for decision-making. See,
e.g., Wood, supra note 186, at 319 (describing a “person-centered philosophy” in guardian
decision-making).
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When the adult with a cognitive incapacity can no longer
reliably express her wishes and needs, the surrogate decisionmaker will typically turn to principles of substituted judgment.193
Unfortunately, substituted judgment has come to mean different
things depending upon the jurisdiction and the context in which a
decision must be made.194 Many modern statutes—particularly
those addressing health-care decisions—clearly contemplate that
the substitute decision-maker is to make the decision that the
person with an incapacity would have made.195
Studies show, however, that often the choices that a
surrogate makes are not the choices that the adult with a cognitive
incapacity would have made;196 instead, the decision is often
based on what the surrogate would want for himself.197 For
example, a surrogate facing a medical decision that could
effectively end the life of an adult with diminished capacity might
convince himself that—regardless of the wishes the adult
expressed when capable—she did not truly contemplate the
situation at hand; thus, the surrogate can justify doing what he
would want for himself by asserting that he had no helpful
guidance from her or, alternatively, that she would have changed
her mind and agreed with him had she foreseen the precise
circumstances now before her.198 Such a surrogate is deviating,
again perhaps unwittingly, from the probable wishes of the person
with a cognitive incapacity.199 Though his decision is improper,
193. See Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 701 (noting that courts typically favor
substituted judgment over a best interests test when the person in question was formerly
competent).
194. See supra note 89 (discussing substituted judgment and noting that its meaning
is not uniform across the states).
195. See Pope, supra note 44, at 208-14 (discussing bases of surrogate decisionmaking).
196. See id. at 215-17 (citing empirical studies, including one indicating that surrogate
decision-makers predicted patient treatment preferences with only 68% accuracy). Professor
Pope further notes that surrogate decision-makers are often unable to distinguish their own
wishes concerning treatment from those of the adult for whom they are to act. Id. at 219
(discussing psychological factors that might account for this tendency).
197. See id. at 219 (noting surrogates’ tendency to confuse their own wishes for those
of the adult with an incapacity whom they represent); KOHN, supra note 23, at 122 (noting
studies indicating that surrogates tend to make decisions based on what they would want).
198. See Madoff, supra note 78, at 965-66 (noting that frequently a person’s perceived
reaction to a future disability is different from her reaction when she experiences that
disability).
199. The deviation is not always unwitting. See Nina A. Kohn & Jeremy A.
Blumenthal, Designating Health Care Decisionmakers for Patients Without Advance
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the deviation is understandable; after all, most of us have a
tremendous ability to believe that others want what we want.
Once again, our role in the assisted decision-making process
requires us to consider our own assumptions and motives as we
consider the wishes of the adult with diminished capacity. When
she can no longer reliably express her wishes and yet there are
reasons to know what decision she would make if capable, in most
instances we should respect that decision.200 Through concerted
efforts to minimize the effects of our prejudices and biases about
incapacity and old age, we are much more likely to assist with
decision-making in ways that comport with the aspirational goals
of modern guardianship, conservatorship, and power of attorney
laws.201

VI. CONCLUSION
Modern surrogate decision-making statutes, especially those
concerning guardianships, conservatorships, and durable powers
of attorney, recognize that adults with diminished capacity are
individuals whose autonomy is not only to be respected, but also
maximized to the fullest degree consistent with their abilities.
Modern surrogate decision-making standards are designed to help
accomplish this goal. While these improvements in statutes and
standards are laudable, they remain largely meaningless if we do
not effectively implement them both in judicial proceedings

Directives: A Psychological Critique, 42 GA. L. REV. 979, 996 (2008) (“[M]any surrogate
decisionmakers refuse to make decisions consistent with a principal’s wishes, even when the
surrogates know those wishes and know that ignoring those wishes does not benefit the
principal.”). Kohn and Blumenthal cite a study in which a third of substitute decision-makers
“were willing to consent to the principal’s participation in that study despite the fact that
participation would not benefit the principal personally” and despite their belief “that the
principal would not willingly participate in a medical study . . . .” Id. The authors also cite
other research showing “that surrogates often plan to base their decisions about treatment at
least partly on their own values.” Id. Finally, the authors note that “research shows that
surrogate decisionmakers often do not know the wishes of the person on whose behalf they
are making decisions, even if they think that they do.” Id.
200. But see, e.g., Tenenbaum, supra note 35, at 690-94 (noting that nursing home
patients with an incapacity might properly be limited from engaging in sexual activity in
public or semi-public parts of nursing home).
201. See FRANK, supra note 17, at 148-49 (discussing effect of bias and prejudice in
judicial proceedings). A process of self-reflection by the substitute decision-maker and an
effort to ascertain the wishes of the person with an incapacity should be the implied if not
express goal of every statutory scheme concerning substitute decision-making.
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involving adults with a cognitive incapacity and in the everyday
lives of those adults.
Although surrogate decision-makers who intentionally flout
the law receive widespread media attention, most surrogates are
good faith actors. Yet this Article has explored how even good
faith actors—including judges, lawyers, guardians ad litem,
conservators, guardians, and agents—can unwittingly allow their
biases and prejudices about incapacity and old age to affect
adversely the lives of those with whose best interest they are
charged.
Misdirected altruism, erroneous assumptions,
convenience, and ignorance are among the factors that all too
often cause surrogate decision-makers to treat the adult with a
cognitive incapacity the same as an infant. The results are
decisions that refuse to acknowledge that, like other adults, adults
with diminished capacity can grow and change and can often
reliably express their needs, wishes, and preferences.
The Article has suggested that, to fulfill the aspirational
goals of modern substitute decision-making statutes and
standards, we should begin by acknowledging our own biases and
prejudices about incapacity and age. When we see clearly the
unique personhood of adults with a diminished capacity, we
become more willing to listen to their wants and needs and less
likely to assume the role of omniscient parent. The habit of
infantilizing the elderly and other adults with diminished capacity
is neither inevitable nor unbreakable, and with careful selfassessment we can take an important step towards limiting its
effect when we serve as surrogate decision-makers.

